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ABSTRACT 
   
The dissertation aims to provide a new perspective on the management of multi-tier 
supply chains. When a firm decides to buy a product from a supplier, the buying firm also 
needs to decide whether to use the supplier to make the lower-tier sourcing decisions or 
to make those decisions in-house. I call the former "supply chain-buy" and the latter 
"supply chain-make." If the choice is supply chain-buy, the buying firm releases sourcing 
control of its bill of materials (BOM) to the top-tier supplier and this supplier, then 
engages with the supply base to determine the BOM's supply chain. If the choice is 
supply chain-make, the buying firm maintains sourcing control of the BOM and engages 
with its own supply base to select the lower-tier suppliers. The dissertation provides a 
theoretical foundation and empirical observations for understanding the supply chain 
make-buy decisions. The dissertation consists of three main chapters: Chapter 2 extends 
the make-or-buy literature into the multi-tier supply management context to provide 
theoretical reasons for engaging in supply chain-make as opposed to supply chain-buy. 
Building on transaction cost economics, the knowledge-based view, and structural hole 
theory, Chapter 2 explains the phenomenon that cannot be fully explained by a single-
theoretic perspective. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the economic and behavioral 
factors that influence individual purchasing managers' supply chain make-buy decision-
making. Specifically, the roles of behavioral uncertainty, interpersonal trust, and 
familiarity are considered. A scenario-based behavioral experiment involving the 
members of the Institute for Supply Management is employed. Lastly, Chapter 4 studies 
the performance implications of particular supply network structures influenced by 
supply chain make-buy decisions. Supply chain make-buy decisions can affect the 
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prevalence of structural holes in supply networks. Chapter 4 investigates the different 
types of structural holes in supply networks. It provides a novel way of understanding 
structural holes in the supply network context by distinguishing structural holes between 
the focal firm's suppliers (horizontal structural holes) from those between its customers 
and suppliers (vertical structural holes). Panel data on supply networks and firm financial 
indicators are used for analysis in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do buying firms engage in their suppliers’ sourcing activities? What are the 
performance implications of this engagement? These are the central questions of this 
dissertation. To help answer these questions, I reframe the decision regarding the 
involvement in a supplier’s sourcing activities as the “supply chain make-buy” decision. 
Should the buying firm “make” the supply chain by exerting control over the selection 
and management of Tier-2 and further upstream suppliers or “buy” the supply chain by 
delegating the control to the Tier-1 supplier? Identifying the drivers and performance 
implications of this supply chain make-buy decision is the objective of this dissertation. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to determining the drivers of supply chain make-buy 
decisions, and Chapter 4 aims to examine the performance implications of the supply 
network structures associated with supply chain make-buy decisions. 
When a firm outsources production of goods or delivery of services to a supplier, 
the buying firm typically outsources selection and management of Tier-2 and further 
upstream suppliers to the Tier-1 supplier. However, if the buying firm wants to exert 
partial control over the selection and management of Tier-2 and further upstream 
suppliers, it can engage in multi-tier supply management practices such as directed 
sourcing and the use of approved vendor lists. Under a directed sourcing arrangement, the 
buying firm contracts directly with a Tier-2 or further upstream supplier and directs the 
Tier-1 supplier to use the component from that particular supplier (Choi & Linton, 2011; 
Mena et al., 2013). An approved vendor list is the list of the key suppliers from which the 
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buying firm recommends a Tier-1 supplier to purchase components whenever possible 
(Choi & Linton, 2011).  Additionally, the buying firm can maintain collaborative 
relationships with Tier-2 or further upstream suppliers.  
Since these multi-tier supply management practices require more managerial 
resources from the buying firm to identify and manage the relationships with the 
suppliers beyond Tier-1 supply chains, the buying firm would not engage in these 
practices unless the benefits outweigh the costs. The conceptual study presented in 
Chapter 2 explains the theoretical reasons for a buying firm to engage in multi-tier 
sourcing practices by identifying the conditions in which the benefits of using multi-tier 
sourcing practices outweigh the costs. 
While the study in Chapter 2 focuses on the firm-level decision-making, the study 
in Chapter 3 focuses on individual supply managers’ decisions regarding the use of multi-
tier supply management practices. Based on the scenario-based role-playing experiment 
involving the members of the Institute for Supply Management, Chapter 3 investigates 
the behavioral tendencies of individual supply managers in making the supply chain 
make-buy decisions. 
Lastly, the study in Chapter 4 examines the performance implications of particular 
supply network structures that are associated with supply chain make-buy decisions. If a 
focal firm maintains direct ties with its Tier-2 suppliers, it will have a closed upstream 
supply network structure. However, if a focal firm’s customers have direct ties with its 
suppliers, the vertical side of its supply network will have a closed structure. Based on 
archival buyer-supplier relationship network data, Chapter 4 reveals the contrasting 
performance implications of the two different supply network structures. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIZING SUPPLY CHAIN-MAKE VERSUS SUPPLY CHAIN-BUY 
 
ABSTRACT 
While the firm-level make-buy decision has been studied in the literature, consideration 
of the supply chain-level make-buy decision is largely missing. Current multi-tier supply 
management practices, which seemingly incur higher governance costs, cannot be 
properly understood without considering the supply chain-level make-buy decision. In 
this conceptual paper, we first introduce and clarify the concepts of supply chain-make 
and supply chain-buy. Then, building on transaction cost economics, the knowledge-
based view, and structural-hole theory, we bring strategic salience to the decisions 
involved in a buying firm’s supply chain make-buy and propose a theoretical framework. 
Keywords: multi-tier supply management, make or buy, supply chain make-buy 
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INTRODUCTION 
All firms face make-buy decisions. The buy decision entails the utilization of the supplier 
capability. This supplier directly transacts with the buying firm and is typically called the 
buying firm’s top-tier supplier. Yet, another decision has been observed to occur at the 
supply chain-level. The buying firm then has to decide whether to use the top-tier 
supplier to make the lower-tier sourcing decisions or to make those decisions in house 
(Choi & Linton, 2011). This is a strategic decision that the current literature has 
overlooked. We call the former “supply chain-buy” and the latter “supply chain-make.” If 
the choice is supply chain-buy, the buying firm releases sourcing control of its bill of 
materials (BOM) to the top-tier supplier and this supplier, then engages with the supply 
base to determine the BOM’s supply chain. If the choice is supply chain-make, the 
buying firm maintains sourcing control of the BOM and, engages with its own supply 
base to select the lower-tier suppliers. Our goal in this paper is to provide a theoretical 
foundation for understanding the supply chain make-buy decisions. 
 Figure 1 contrasts firm-level make-buy and supply chain make-buy. From the 
buying firm’s perspective, a firm-level make-buy decision is the decision regarding 
which firm between the buying firm and top-tier supplier to perform production 
activities. According to the TCE literature, this choice between internal versus external 
production is essentially a binary decision (Williamson, 1985). While there can be 
multiple governance choices (e.g., contractual, relational, hierarchy, alliance, and joint 
venture), the make-buy decision itself entails a binary outcome − in-house or outsourced. 
The direct transaction between the buying firm and top-tier supplier becomes the unit-of-
analysis. The choice of firm-level buy does not automatically translate into the choice of 
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supply chain-buy. A buying firm often opts for firm-level buy, yet retain decision making 
about which “supply chain” performs the production activity. A buying firm can either 
“buy” the existing supply chain used by its top-tier suppliers, or it can “make” the supply 
chain by specifying which lower-tier suppliers will produce and deliver the parts in the 
BOM. In this case, the unit-of-analysis is the bundle of transactions including both direct 
and indirect transactions in the supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparing Firm-Level Make-Buy and Supply Chain Make-Buy 
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 In contrast to the firm-level make-buy decision being binary, the supply chain 
make-buy decision occurs across a range of options. A supply chain-make decision 
involves a choice regarding how much of the BOM will be controlled by the buying firm. 
That is, the buying firm can try to control the majority or only some of the lower-tier 
suppliers. If the buying firm chooses not to control, the decision reduces to a supply 
chain-buy decision. For instance, Chrysler is engaged in supply chain-buy of its center 
console assembly by delegating the sourcing decisions to its top-tier supplier, whereas 
Honda dictates many of the key parts and raw material suppliers to the top-tier supplier 
(Choi & Hong, 2002). The scope of supply chain-make is decided depending on how 
many lower-tier suppliers are specified by the buying firm. This is the essence of the 
supply chain make-buy decision. 
 Supply chain-buy is ubiquitous. When a university contracts with Dell or Lenovo 
to supply laptops, it does not control the lower-tier suppliers. Dell or Lenovo as a supplier 
makes the sourcing decisions. The university has chosen to “buy” a supply chain. 
Compared to supply chain-make, supply chain-buy is more straightforward and requires 
less managerial resources. The buying firm simply delegates the responsibility of lower-
tier sourcing to the supplier and pays it for this extra work. In contrast, supply chain-
make necessitates a more strategic approach. For example, aircraft and aircraft engine 
manufacturers including Boeing, General Electric, Northrop Grumman, Rolls-Royce, and 
Lockheed Martin provide lists of approved processors or vendors to direct their top-tier 
suppliers to use specific lower-tier suppliers (Boeing, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015; 
Northrop Grumman, 2015). Apple selects lower-tier suppliers and keeps direct contracts 
with them (Apple Inc., 2015; Satariano & Burrows, 2011). Oracle provides applications 
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to promote collaboration among top-tier and second-tier suppliers while gaining control 
over their extended supply chains (Oracle, 2015). These well-known buying companies 
show a variety of different approaches of supply chain-make. 
 Without considering both direct and indirect transactions embedded in the BOM 
structure of an assembly, the buying firm would simply rely on either market or hierarchy 
(Williamson, 1975). By introducing supply chain-make as another option for managing 
transactions, we provide a novel way of understanding outsourcing decisions. Our aim is 
to understand why buying companies engage in supply chain-make as opposed to supply 
chain-buy. More specifically, we investigate the key variables that affect a buying firm’s 
supply chain-make versus supply chain-buy decision and propose an underlying model 
that captures the supply chain-level make-buy decision. Because supply chain-make 
requires more resources and effort to initiate and manage ties with lower-tier suppliers, an 
underlying rationale should exist for the motivation behind the supply chain-make 
decision. We argue that transaction cost economics (TCE) alone cannot fully explain the 
phenomenon of supply chain-make, which incurs additional governance costs for the 
buying firm (Williamson, 1975). The knowledge based view (KBV) of the firm (e.g., 
Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992) is another body of literature applied to make-buy 
decisions. This too cannot sufficiently explain the buying firm’s decision to control 
lower-tier suppliers. In sum, a further conceptual development is needed to align theory 
with practice. Recently, scholars have enumerated the usefulness of social network 
concepts to understand supply chain dynamics (Borgatti & Li, 2009; Choi & Kim, 2008). 
 To fill the current theoretical void, we build on TCE, KBV, and structural-hole 
theory. By doing so, we attempt to explain the phenomenon that is not fully explained by 
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a single-theoretic perspective. In addition, we intend to contribute to the literature on 
make-buy decisions by suggesting an expanded unit-of-analysis at the supply chain level. 
Specifically, we adopt as our unit-of-analysis the bundle of transactions embedded in the 
BOM structure, which recognizes the multilevel nature of make-buy decisions. 
 Our paper is organized as the following. After discussing the existing literature 
and how our study advances the extant literature, we conceptualize the supply chain 
make-buy decision. We present the archetypes of control used in the choice of supply 
chain-make. Then, we identify the key underlying variables that influence supply chain 
make-buy decisions and present a heuristic model of supply chain make-buy decision 
making. The final sections discuss theoretical and managerial implications of our study. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Multi-Tier Supply Chain Management 
The literature on firm-level make-buy decisions has used transaction cost economics 
(TCE) as a dominant theoretical framework (e.g., Mantel, Tatikonda, & Liao, 2006; 
McIvor, 2009). More recently, Parmigiani (2007) proposes a “make-and-buy” strategy 
composed of concurrent making and buying of the same or similar products by the 
buying firm, and Park and Ro (2011) develop “pseudo-make” to describe the practices 
which the buying firm engages in the design of the product while the suppliers execute 
production. These scholars have tried to consider the more complex nature of make-buy 
decisions. Nonetheless, TCE adopts the individual transaction as the unit-of-analysis 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975). 
As a result, the researchers studying firm-level make-buy decisions have generally 
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examined bilateral transactions (Wever, Wognum, Trienekens, & Omta, 2012), and the 
product being exchanged in a bilateral transaction has been treated as a whole, undivided 
item. 
We begin with an observation that the item in transaction consists of separate 
parts or materials. In other words, the item being exchanged between the buying firm and 
supplier generally contains a BOM structure. A BOM lists a product’s parts and materials 
that are associated with the suppliers (Chase, Jacobs, & Aquilano, 2006). Considering 
this BOM structure, a bilateral transaction of an item includes both the “direct 
transactions” and “indirect transactions.” From the buying firm’s perspective, direct 
transactions occur with its top-tier suppliers (i.e. the buyer is directly engaged in the 
transaction), whereas indirect transactions take place among the suppliers (i.e. the buyer 
is indirectly engaged through its top-tier suppliers). 
 Supply chain management researchers have recognized the importance of 
understanding and managing “extended” or “multi-tier” supply chains (Choi & Linton, 
2011; Lee, 2010; Mena, Humphries, & Choi, 2013; New, 2010). As suppliers are 
“embedded in larger supply networks rather than in isolation” (Choi & Kim, 2008: 5), an 
understanding about further upstream supply chains should help buying firms develop 
effective supply management strategies. Lee (2010) notes that critical players in a firm’s 
supply chain are often several tiers away from the firm. Yan, Choi, Kim, and Yang 
(2015) offer a typology of critical suppliers in extended supply networks. New (2010) 
recommends companies to use technologies to track down direct and indirect suppliers 
and build transparent supply chains. Choi and Linton (2011) suggest that buying firms 
should establish direct relationships with key lower-tier suppliers. 
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 In response, Mena et al. (2013) adopt an inductive theory-building approach and 
investigate how multi-tier supply chains operate. Their analysis offers insights for the 
power dynamics and interdependence across the buying firm, its supplier (top-tier), and 
its supplier’s supplier (lower-tier). Although they provide costs and benefits for buying 
firms to connect directly to their key lower-tier suppliers, left unanswered is when and 
how much the buying firm needs to be connected with their lower-tier suppliers. While a 
buying firm can influence key product characteristics by directly connecting with the 
lower-tier suppliers (Mena et al., 2013), it can also specify product characteristics to its 
top-tier suppliers and monitor them without directly connecting with lower-tier suppliers. 
Therefore, the question remains as to what are the underlying reasons for the buying firm 
to keep control over the lower-tier suppliers instead of delegating lower-tier supplier 
management to the top-tier supplier. Moreover, how far should the buying firm go to 
control the lower-tier suppliers? Our paper seeks to answer these questions by providing 
a framework that theorizes the buying firm’s make-buy decisions at the supply chain 
level. 
 
Conceptual Framing of Supply Chain-Make versus Supply Chain-Buy 
Given the firm-level “buy” decision, the buying firm considers whether to “make the 
supply chain” by retaining the component sourcing decisions or to “buy the supply chain” 
by delegating to the top-tier supplier the component sourcing decisions. In the context of 
the value chain perspective (Porter, 1985), the supply chain make-buy decision is 
equivalent to outsourcing a support activity (i.e., sourcing) together with a primary 
activity (i.e., production). When the buying firm outsources production to the top-tier 
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supplier, the component-level sourcing activities are often outsourced to the same 
supplier (i.e., supply chain-buy). 
 Suppose a buying firm has chosen “supply chain-buy” and purchases a product 
(e.g., anti-lock break system) from a top-tier supplier. The top-tier supplier is then 
entrusted to buy parts and components from its own supply base, which would be lower-
tier suppliers for the buying firm. They may be second-tier suppliers or may also include 
some of the third- or even fourth-tier suppliers (Choi & Hong, 2002). These lower-tier 
suppliers produce and deliver the items indicated in the multi-level BOM that lists the 
components and subcomponents. For instance, Google is engaged in the supply chain-
buy of its Nexus 5 smartphone (Google Inc., 2014; LG Electronics Inc., 2014). A top-tier 
supplier, LG Electronics, articulates the BOM and makes the sourcing decisions. That 
means, LGE’s suppliers of Nexus 5 components, including display, processor, cameras, 
battery, and memory suppliers, become lower-tier suppliers to Google. 
 Table 1 distinguishes the supply chain make-buy decision from the firm-level 
make-buy decision. Buying firms choosing supply chain-make rely on external 
production but partially or fully internalize component or materials sourcing (upper right 
quadrant). Buying firms choosing supply chain-buy rely on its top-tier suppliers for both 
production and sourcing activities (lower right quadrant). In contrast, buying firms 
choosing firm-level make perform both production and sourcing internally (upper left 
quadrant). Lastly, when a buying firm decides to internalize production but to outsource 
sourcing, it can utilize third- or fourth-party sourcing or logistics providers (lower left 
quadrant). 
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 As explained in the introduction, the outcome of a supply chain make-buy 
decision (i.e., the scope of supply chain-make) is not binary. Rather, it can be described 
as a proportion of the suppliers of the components in the BOM controlled by the buying 
firm. Further, the supply chain make-buy choice is not static – the buying firm can 
continuously increase or decrease the scope of supply chain-make. For example, after the 
recognition of behavioral uncertainty and supply risks in the garment category in the 
wake of Tazreen factory fire and Rana Plaza collapse, Walmart increased its direct 
control over the lower-tier garment suppliers in Bangladesh (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
2015). There are three different points on a continuum that the buying firm can select 
when facing a supply chain make-buy decision – extensive supply chain make, partial 
supply chain make, and supply chain buy. 
 
Table 1 
Comparing Supply Chain Make-Buy with other Practices 
 
Locus of production activity 
Internal External 
Sourcing  
responsibility  
 
Internal Firm-level “make” “Supply chain-make” 
External 
Sourcing outsourced to a 
third-party 
“Supply chain-buy” 
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Extensive supply chain-make. Apple outsources its manufacturing operations to 
Foxconn. However, it retains control over nearly all component sourcing decisions. For 
example, in 2011, the company directly managed 156 production suppliers that accounted 
for 97 percent of the company’s procurement expenditures (Apple Inc., 2012). The 
company requires that these suppliers comply with its supplier code of conduct and 
performs auditing program across its supply chain to ensure supplier compliance. 
Foxconn, as the top-tier supplier, represents only 1.8 to 2.0 percent of the total sales value 
of an iPhone or iPad (Kraemer, Linden, & Dedrick, 2011). A much larger portion of the 
total sales value of Apple products is captured by the suppliers of processors, memory 
chips, and LCDs (Hesseldahl, 2011; Barboza, 2010). As an electronics manufacturing 
service (EMS) provider to Apple, Foxconn is directed to work with the component 
suppliers selected and managed by Apple. Apple collaborates with those lower-tier 
component suppliers from the new product development stage, working with them to 
convert prototypes into mass production. 
Partial supply chain-make. In their study of automobile supply networks, Choi and 
Hong (2002: 491) note that Honda combines “delegated authority with a centralized but 
more subtle control.” Honda allows its top-tier supplier to select most of its suppliers, but 
it also selects a few of the lower-tier suppliers and asks the top-tier suppliers to work with 
them. Especially for high-priced items and items outside the top-tier suppliers’ expertise, 
Honda centrally controls lower-tier suppliers. Many of these lower-tier suppliers that 
have a direct relationship with Honda often show more loyalty to Honda than to the top-
tier supplier, strengthening Honda’s control over multiple tiers of the supply network. 
Even when Honda does not have direct contract with the lower-tier suppliers, it tries to 
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minimize supply risks associated with cost, innovation, and sustainability by providing an 
“approved vendor list” (AVL) to the top-tier suppliers and making a strong 
recommendation to choose vendors from the lists (Choi & Linton, 2011). 
Supply chain-buy. About a third of the American retailers, including JC Penney, 
Kohl’s, Macy’s, Sears, and Walmart, outsource garment sourcing decisions to the 
sourcing and logistics company Li & Fung (Urbina & Bradsher, 2013). As one of the 
largest top-tier suppliers to these retailers, Li & Fung controls a network of 15,000 
suppliers in over 60 countries. Drawing from its knowledge of supplier capacity and 
capability, the company fulfills its customer orders with flexibility and speed by 
subcontracting garment manufacturing to the factories around the world (Magretta, 
1998). Since buying firms delegate all garment sourcing and logistics activities to Li & 
Fung and since it subsequently makes subcontracting decisions, Li & Fung’s customers 
are mostly uninformed about the factories supplying the products to their products. 
Governance control of the factories is typically executed only by the top-tier supplier, Li 
& Fung. For example, when it was revealed that some of the garments for Disney, Sears, 
and Walmart were produced by the Tazreen factory in Bangladesh, where 112 workers 
died from the factory fire in 2012, the three companies claimed that they did not have 
knowledge of this factory because the manufacturing was arranged by Li & Fung and its 
subcontractors (Ali Manik & Yardley, 2013). Uninformed, unauthorized subcontracting 
problems in the garment manufacturing industry were highlighted again in the wake of 
the Rana Plaza garment factory collapse that killed 1131 workers in 2013. 
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Archetypes of Control Used under Supply Chain-Make 
A buying firm can use a variety of control strategies when engaged in supply chain-make. 
Depending on its relative power over the top-tier supplier and whether it has formal 
contracts with lower-tier suppliers, these practices of control can be broadly categorized 
into the following four types (see Table 2). 
Directed sourcing. Directed sourcing can be used when the buying firm has relatively 
high power over the top-tier supplier (Choi & Hong, 2002). Under a directed sourcing 
arrangement, the buying firm contracts directly with a lower-tier supplier and directs the 
top-tier supplier to use the component from that particular supplier (Choi & Linton, 2011; 
Mena et al., 2013). For instance, while Honda may control a lower-tier supplier for cost, 
it asks the top-tier supplier to manage this lower-tier supplier for quality and delivery. 
Directed sourcing arrangements are often found in the automotive industry (Choi & 
Hong, 2002; Park and Hartley, 2002; Mena et al., 2013). 
Approved vendor list. When the buying firm has relatively high power over the top-tier 
supplier but does not want or is unable to establish formal contracts with lower-tier 
suppliers, the firm can use an approved vendor list (AVL) or list of approved processors 
to control component sourcing. AVL is the list of the key suppliers from which the 
buying firm recommends a top-tier supplier to purchase components whenever possible 
(Choi & Linton, 2011). Many of the lower-tier suppliers on AVLs do not supply directly 
to the buying firms but they supply to the buying firms’ top-tier suppliers. Even so, the 
buying firms can regard these lower tier suppliers as involved in “making their products.” 
If parts fail after sales, consumers perceive the products from the buying firms have 
failed (Choi & Hong, 2002), and by using AVL, the buying firm reduces the risk of parts 
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from suppliers unknown to them from entering into their products. Many aircraft and 
aircraft engine manufacturers use AVL for specifying the key lower-tier suppliers 
(Boeing, 2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015; Northrop Grumman, 2015). 
Strategic alliances with lower-tier suppliers. If the buying firm has relatively little 
power over the top-tier supplier, it can be difficult to use directed sourcing or impose 
component suppliers from an AVL. In this case, the buying firm can attempt to control 
component sourcing by forming formal strategic alliances with some key lower-tier 
suppliers of the top-tier supplier. Such a strategic alliance seeks to formally align goals 
and establish joint activities between the buying firm and lower-tier suppliers. Based on 
coalition theory (Caplow, 1956, 1959), Bastl, Johnson, and Choi (2013) suggest that 
buying firms that form cooperative relationships with lower-tier suppliers can gain 
control over top-tier suppliers by exercising collective power through the coalitions. 
Collaborative relationships with lower-tier suppliers. Strategic alliance requires the 
participants to align goals and put significant effort into formation and maintenance of a 
relationship (Gulati, 1995; Kale & Singh, 2009). Therefore, buying firms may prefer an 
informal collaborative relationship with lower-tier suppliers as a means to gain some 
degree of control over a powerful top-tier supplier. The buying firm often forms this type 
of collaborative relationship with the lower-tier supplier, when the relationship between 
the top-tier supplier and its lower-tier supplier seems unstable (Mena et al. 2013). 
Informal communications, meetings at networking events, and even joint participation in 
various events like conferences can engender this type of collaboration (Cousins, 
Handfield, Lawson, & Petersen, 2006; Cousins & Menguc, 2006). 
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Table 2 
Managerial Controls Used for Supply Chain-Make 
 
The relationship 
between the buying firm and lower-tier supplier 
Formal Informal 
The buying-firm’s 
relative power over 
the top-tier supplier 
High Directed sourcing Approved vendor list 
Low Strategic alliance Collaborative relationship 
 
FORMULATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
To employ supply chain-make, the buying firm must incur cost for identifying, selecting, 
negotiating with, monitoring, and maintaining the lower-tier suppliers (Wever et al., 
2012). One must consider, then, the conditions for which the cost of supply chain-make 
could be lower than that of supply chain-buy. Also, there are strategic benefits and future 
opportunities that supply chain-make could provide over supply chain-buy. Building on 
TCE (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985) and the knowledge-based view (KBV) of 
the firm (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992), we identify the variables associated with 
both cost-driven and strategic reasons for selecting supply chain-make over supply chain-
buy. In addition, we apply structural-hole theory (Burt, 1992) to explain how supply 
chain-make can overcome the potential disadvantages involved in supply chain-buy. 
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To develop propositions, we present the theoretical scope and assumptions of our 
paper. First, we focus on transactions in the strategic quadrant (high profit impact, high 
supply risk) in the classification of purchasing items by Kraljic (1983). Supply chain-
make requires significant management resources and effort (Mena et al., 2013). In 
addition, the buying firm is engaged in a recurrent exchange relationship where it has at 
least some expertise in the product in transaction. If the buying firm does not have 
capabilities or the requisite knowledge base (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) to identify 
key lower-tier suppliers and engage in supply chain-make, it is simply performing “basic 
procurement” (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). Lastly, in line with TCE, we assume that the 
buying firm’s decision makers have bounded rationality and that the top-tier and lower-
tier suppliers would behave opportunistically. 
 
Transaction Cost Economics and Supply Chain Make-Buy 
According to TCE, the firm’s decision to transact an operation internally (hierarchy) or 
externally (market) depends on its ex-ante and ex-post costs of exchange (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975). Transactions occur when goods are transferred across different firms 
(Williamson, 1981) and transaction costs are described as “frictions” of doing business 
with external firms (Williamson, 1985). Williamson (1975, 1985) maintains that due to 
bounded rationality and opportunism of economic actors, certain transaction dimensions 
− behavioral uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity − increase the costs of market 
governance (i.e., transaction costs). If the costs of market governance exceeds the costs of 
hierarchical governance, the firm chooses to internalize the transaction (Williamson, 
1975, 1985). 
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Unlike the firm-level make-buy decision, the supply chain make-buy decision 
involves the analysis of transactions at two different levels − one at the direct transaction-
level between the buying firm and top-tier supplier and the other at the indirect 
transaction-level between the buying firm and lower-tier suppliers. Although our study 
occurs at the supply chain-level, two of the three dimensions from TCE remain relevant: 
behavioral uncertainty and asset specificity – frequency is less relevant because we focus 
on recurrent exchange relationships between the buying firm and supplier. Behavioral 
uncertainty and asset specificity are relevant because when the buying firm decides for a 
direct transaction, it can still choose to keep some control over the indirect transactions 
involving the component sourcing activities. In other words, whether to perform 
component sourcing activities internally or externally and how much of the component 
sourcing to control or delegate are influenced by behavioral uncertainty and asset 
specificity. 
Behavioral uncertainty. Behavioral uncertainty creates governance problems in 
exchange relationships (Williamson, 1975, 1985) stemming primarily from the difficulty 
the buying firm faces in managing suppliers to meet performance requirements (John & 
Weitz, 1988; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1985). This difficulty is 
conceptualized as the difficulty in screening, supervising, and monitoring an exchange 
partner (John & Weitz, 1988; Koch & McGrath, 1996) and the difficulty in measuring 
performance (Chandler, McKelvie, & Davidsson, 2009; Stump and Heide, 1996). In the 
context of supply chain-buy, behavioral uncertainty makes it difficult for the buying firm 
to ensure the performance of the delegated sourcing activities. We argue that the buying 
firm faces the supply chain make-buy decision when it continues to perceive 
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unacceptable behavioral uncertainty in the direct transaction. After Tazreen factory fire 
and Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, Walmart initiated direct relationships with the 
factories in Bangladesh to provide supports for quality and safety improvements, even 
though these factories are the second-tier suppliers to the retailer (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
2015). The retailer also added the “one-strike you’re out” policy on unauthorized 
subcontracting. 
 Relying on supply chain-buy under high behavioral uncertainty may leave the 
buying firm vulnerable to the top-tier supplier’s potential opportunism. When the buying 
firm delegates the selection and control of the second-tier suppliers to the top-tier 
supplier, the top-tier supplier becomes the bridge between the buying firm and the 
second-tier vendors (Burt, 2000a, 2002; Li & Choi, 2009). The top-tier supplier becomes 
tertius gaudens or “the third that benefits” (Simmel, 1922; Merton, 1957). Under this 
condition, the buying firm and the lower-tier suppliers are not directly linked together but 
indirectly linked through the top-tier supplier. There is a “structural hole” between the 
buying firm and its lower-tier suppliers (Burt, 1992). The top-tier supplier in the bridge 
position can broker information flow between people and control the activities that 
involve lower-tier suppliers. As the top-tier supplier takes advantage of its position and 
selectively transfers upstream supply chain information to the buying firm, the task 
becomes even more difficult for the buying firm to verify the top-tier supplier’s 
compliance. For example, the top-tier supplier with delegated sourcing authority can 
more easily disguise component cost or quality from the buying firm (Choi & Linton, 
2011). 
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 Supply chain-make helps the buying firm to curb behavioral uncertainty by 
allowing the firm to acquire upstream supply chain information directly from key lower-
tier suppliers. Burt (2002) terms this loss of the bridge position as “bridge decay.” By 
having direct linkages to the lower-tier suppliers that could critically impact the buying 
firm’s performance requirements, the buying firm is able to prevent the top-tier supplier 
from exploiting its bridge position. For instance, knowledge of cost reductions in the 
lower-tier supply market can aid in price negotiations. Awareness of potential quality 
problems at sub-components that are interdependent with other components can aid in 
better product design specifications. Therefore, the buying firm facing difficulties in 
verifying the top-tier supplier’s performance will expand the scope of supply chain-make 
to reduce behavioral uncertainty. 
 In contrast to behavioral uncertainty in direct transactions, behavioral uncertainty 
in indirect transactions is likely to reduce the buying firm’s scope of supply chain-make. 
In order for the buying firm to initiate collaborative relationships with the lower-tier 
suppliers, the buying firm needs to be able to reliably assess their performance (Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). Moreover, directing the top-tier supplier to work with 
specific lower-tier suppliers creates additional complexity in the supply network as the 
relationships between the top-tier supplier and selected lower-tier suppliers are influenced 
by the relationships between the buying firm and lower-tier suppliers (Bastl et al., 2013; 
Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2001; Choi & Hong, 2002; Mena et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the buying firm engages in supply chain-make when it has some certainty 
about the lower-tier suppliers’ behaviors. In contrast, if the buying firm faces difficulties 
in measuring performances of the lower-tier suppliers, it would prefer to delegate 
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component sourcing activities to the top-tier supplier and require it to manage the lower-
tier suppliers and strengthen monitoring activities. 
Proposition 1: Behavioral uncertainty in the (a) direct transaction of the purchased 
product increases the scope of supply chain-make, while that in the (b) 
indirect transactions of the components decreases the scope of supply 
chain-make. 
Asset specificity. Williamson (1985) presents asset specificity as the most important 
factor that differentiates ways of organizing transactions. Asset specificity refers to the 
“durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions” 
(Williamson, 1985). As specific assets are not reusable outside the relationship between 
the original exchange partners, a long-term relationship is valued (Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
At the same time, asset specificity gives rise to contractual or relational safeguard 
problems because of potential exploitation of specific assets by exchange partners 
(Geyskens et al., 2006). TCE predicts that transactions characterized by asset specificity 
will be internalized (i.e., organized by unified ownership and vertically integrated) 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
 In the context of our study, asset specificity refers to both specific investments 
required for the direct transaction between the buying firm and top-tier supplier as well as 
the indirect transactions between the buying firm and lower-tier suppliers. First, asset 
specificity in the direct transaction is required for the buying firm to consider the choice 
of supply chain-make. Without the presence of asset specificity, the relationship between 
the buying firm and top-tier supplier is too fragile (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Ganesan, 1994) 
for engaging in supply chain-make as one firm can easily end the exchange relationship. 
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Therefore, the buying firm’s tendency when direct transaction asset specificity is low 
would be to avoid the costly control over the lower-tier suppliers. However, as asset 
specificity in the direct transaction increases, the incremental cost for increasing control 
beyond the top-tier supplier is reduced. Therefore, the buying firm would move toward 
more direct control over the top-tier supplier’s component sourcing activities to safeguard 
from potential opportunistic behaviors. 
 In transactions between the buying firm and lower-tier suppliers, asset specificity 
also influences to the scope of supply chain-make. If the indirect transaction of a 
component requires specific investments from the buying firm, the buying firm would 
prefer not to delegate the sourcing of that specific component to the top-tier supplier. 
Such delegation could expose the buying firm to the risk of the top-tier supplier switching 
the lower-tier supplier. For example, Apple has worked with a second-tier supplier 
Catcher Technology for a specific new tooling equipment to develop the aluminum body 
of the MacBook (Satariano & Burrows, 2011). With significant joint investment from 
both companies in aluminum body technology, Apple has expanded the use of Catcher’s 
aluminum body to other product lines including the iPad and iPhone (Dou, Liu, & 
Negishi, 2014). Even though the top-tier supplier Foxconn itself has aluminum body 
production capability, Apple has been using Catcher’s aluminum body because of the 
specific investments made together with this second-tier supplier (Blankfeld, 2015). 
Thus, if the BOM of the purchased product includes more components requiring specific 
investments, the buying firm would try to control the sourcing of those components. 
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Proposition 2: Asset specific investments for the (a) direct transaction of the purchased 
product and/or (b) indirect transactions of the components increase the 
scope of supply chain-make. 
Exposure to supply risk. Uncertainty and risk are different but related. Uncertainty 
represents exogenous disturbances (Williamson, 1985) while risk is defined as the 
possibility of loss (Yates & Stone, 1992; Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Unlike uncertainty, 
risk involves the probabilities and impacts of the events associated with loss (Yates & 
Stone, 1992). In the supply management context, the “impact” of loss incorporates the 
“strategic importance” dimension of the Kraljic matrix (Kraljic, 1983; Olsen & Ellram, 
1997). When the buying firm evaluates transactions of the product and components for a 
supply chain make-buy decision, it would have to consider probabilities and impacts of 
potential risk events. 
 Supply risk refers to the potential loss associated with an event in inbound supply 
that prevents the buying firm from meeting customer demand (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 
2010; Zsidisin, 2003). The potential loss that embodies supply risk includes not only a 
financial or performance loss but also a physical or social loss to the natural environment 
and society (Cousins, Lamming, & Bowen, 2004; Mitchell, 1995). Choi and Krause 
(2006) regard supply risk as one of the key areas of supply base management since it 
covers the risk beyond the risk of supplier opportunism. 
 Relying on only the top-tier supplier for sourcing can expose the buying firm to 
supply risks associated with financially, environmentally, and socially undesirable events. 
This is in part because the top-tier supplier places its own best interests first, creating 
possible lapses in risk management measures to protect the buying firm. For example, a 
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plant explosion at Evonik, the world’s largest specialty resin producer and a lower-tier 
supplier for many automakers, caused automotive fuel and brake line part shortage 
problems for GM, Ford, Toyota, and Chrysler (Bennett & Hromadko, 2012). When the 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill happened in 2010, BP was blamed for delegating decision-
making to its chief subcontractors − Halliburton and Transocean − who oversaw offshore 
drilling operation of the second-tier supplier, Deepwater Horizon (Broder, 2010).  
 Sheffi and Rice (2005) argue that buying firms should build control systems that 
detect supply disruption quickly and support timely corrective actions. Under a supply 
chain-buy decision that allows the top-tier supplier to occupy the structural hole, the 
buying firm faces difficulties in securing proper upstream information necessary for 
detecting supply disruptions and preparing timely corrective actions. In contrast, a supply 
chain-make arrangement helps the buying firm to be resilient to supply risks by providing 
direct access to upstream supply information and, thus, stability in the supply network 
(Choi & Hong, 2002). Lee (2010) argues that companies should examine the members in 
the extended supply chains and collaborate with the lower-tier suppliers to reduce 
environmental risks in the supply chains. Undesirable events in inbound supply can occur 
at any tiers of the supply chain. Therefore, as the level of exposure to supply risk in direct 
transactions and in indirect transactions of the product increases, the buying firm will 
build a more resilient supply chain by increasing the scope of supply chain-make. 
Proposition 3: The level of supply risk exposure in the (a) direct transaction of the 
purchased product and/or (b) indirect transactions of the components 
increase the scope of supply chain-make. 
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The Knowledge-Based View of the Firm and Supply Chain Make-Buy 
While the supply chain make-buy model based on TCE considers the buying firm’s need 
for controlling risks and economizing governance cost, it does not take into account the 
potential future opportunities that supply chain-make could provide over supply chain-
buy. Based on the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm, we identify the key 
underlying variables that give rise to the opportunities (e.g., technological development) 
provided by supply chain-make. 
According to KBV, firms are better at integrating and applying individual 
knowledge than markets when the knowledge is tacit and the activities between the 
exchanging units are interdependent (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Weigelt, 
2009). Since the market cannot achieve the stability of the knowledge exchange 
relationships within the firm and gives rise to opportunism under highly interdependent 
exchange activities (Grant, 1996), the buying firm would likely choose to internalize 
operations characterized by high tacitness and interdependence. By extension, the supply 
chain make-buy decision is also influenced by the tacitness of the knowledge associated 
with the purchased product and interdependence in the product architecture. If the buying 
firm relies on supply chain-buy (i.e. turning to the market), even though the sourcing of 
the product is characterized by high tacitness and interdependence, the firm may be 
exposed to higher risk of knowledge erosion (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999; Teece, 1986) 
and lose potential future opportunities created from successfully integrating and applying 
knowledge (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; Weigelt, 2009). 
Tacitness of intellectual property. Product-related intellectual property (i.e., product 
design and component technologies) can be protected by patent, copyright, trademark, 
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allied rights, and trade secrets (Choi, Budny, & Wank, 2004; Cornish, Llewelyn, & 
Aplin, 1989). If a firm owns the intellectual property associated with the product or 
component in exchange and licenses it to the exchange partner, the licensor-licensee 
relationship is added to the buyer-supplier relationship, which is called the knowledge 
supply chain (Choi et al., 2004). In this setting, the tacitness of the knowledge being 
transferred between the two firms can critically influence the firm’s supply chain make-
buy decision. Tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and therefore difficult to be 
transferred (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Von Krogh, 2009). When the product-related 
intellectual property specifications can be easily codified, the buying firm and top-tier 
supplier can efficiently exchange information regarding the product (Gereffi, Humphrey, 
& Sturgeon, 2005). They can also exchange specifications regarding component sourcing 
with little coordination efforts. 
In contrast, when the knowledge associated with the intellectual property is tacit, 
then at least one of the two exchange partners may not fully understand the needs and 
specifications involved in component sourcing, and the buying firm may not be able to 
relinquish component sourcing decisions entirely to the top-tier supplier. As the tacitness 
of the product or component-related intellectual property increases, the difficulty in 
coordinating component sourcing activities through supply chain-buy would also 
increase. This could limit the buying firm’s integration and application of the product-
related knowledge and hamper technological developments (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 
2001; Parmigiani, 2007). Thus, the buying firm would engage more extensively in supply 
chain-make when the product and component-related intellectual properties are 
characterized by higher tacitness. 
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Proposition 4: Tacitness of the intellectual properties of the (a) product in direct 
transaction and/or (b) components in indirect transactions increases the 
scope of supply chain-make. 
Interdependence in the product architecture. Interdependence in the product 
architecture causes technological uncertainty associated with the purchased product 
(Brusoni et al., 2001; Furlan, Cabigiosu, & Camuffo, 2014; Henderson & Clark, 1990). 
Technological uncertainty refers to the difficulty in forecasting the technical requirements 
associated with the purchased product and its components (Geyskens et al., 2006; Stump 
& Heide, 1996; Walker & Weber, 1984). Interdependence in the product architecture is 
the degree of the coupling among components in a product (Brusoni et al., 2001; 
Terwiesch & Loch, 1999). When the product architecture is interdependent, it becomes 
more challenging for the buying firm to monitor the suppliers’ technological capabilities 
and cost reduction efforts (Camuffo, Furlan, & Rettore, 2007). If a component is tightly 
coupled with other components, a change in the components requires changes in other 
parts of the product and creates a “snowball effect” in engineering changes (Terwiesch & 
Loch, 1999). Engineering changes such as “changes to parts, drawings, or software that 
have already been released” (Terwiesch & Loch, 1999) have various negative impacts on 
product development and production costs. 
 If the buying firm chooses supply chain-buy, interdependent product architecture 
creates information asymmetry. In this case, the top-tier supplier would have more 
information about component technological changes than the buying firm. Given its 
position as the bridge, the top-tier supplier is set up to take advantage of the information 
asymmetry. This information asymmetry can gradually erode the buying firm’s 
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technological capability. KBV researchers have argued that excessive outsourcing of 
upstream activities means firms miss opportunities to learn technological advancements 
in times of technological changes (Brusoni et al., 2001; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; 
Weigelt, 2009). If the buying firm completely outsources its sourcing activities to the top-
tier supplier (i.e., supply chain-buy), the buying firm would face information 
disadvantage over the top-tier supplier regarding component technologies and lose 
opportunities to learn, impeding the development of its technological capabilities. 
 A natural way to tackle this technological information asymmetry is to obtain 
information directly from the lower-tier suppliers. Maintaining direct ties with lower-tier 
suppliers should provide more opportunities for the buying firm to learn new 
developments in component technologies, detect engineering change requirements early, 
and strengthen its technological capabilities. Over time, supply chain-make will allow the 
buying firm to accumulate information critical to engineering changes and enhance 
know-how on interdependencies in the product architecture and managing the impacts of 
engineering changes. Therefore, if the product in transaction is characterized by more 
interdependent product architecture, the buying firm would increase the extensiveness of 
supply chain-make. 
Proposition 5: Interdependence in the product architecture in transaction increases the 
scope of supply chain-make. 
 
A Heuristic Model for Supply Chain Make-Buy 
We consolidate key variables into a heuristic model that integrates the TCE and KBV 
arguments. TCE provides the governance cost side rationale for selecting supply chain-
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make over supply chain-buy. Governance cost of supply chain-buy represents the 
governance cost of the exchange relationship with the top-tier supplier, while governance 
cost of supply chain-make includes the governance cost of the exchange relationships 
with the top-tier supplier and with lower-tier suppliers. At the low levels of asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and supply risk, the governance cost of supply chain-
make is higher than governance cost of supply chain-buy, given the additional efforts 
required to manage the relationships with the lower-tier suppliers. However, as asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and supply risk increase, the governance cost of 
supply chain-buy exceeds the governance cost of supply chain-make. Under higher asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and supply risk, letting the top-tier supplier to control 
all sourcing activities will incur higher governance cost by restricting the buying firm’s 
access to information that can be critical to mitigate the risk of opportunism and supply 
risk. Based on the TCE framework, we can predict that the buying firm would choose 
supply chain-make when the governance cost of supply chain-buy exceeds that of supply 
chain-make. 
 The supply chain make-buy decision based on simply governance cost, however, 
ignores the opportunity cost of choosing supply chain-buy over supply chain-make. 
Supply chain-buy exposes the buying firm to the risk of knowledge erosion (Lorenzoni & 
Lipparini, 1999; Teece, 1986), hence the potential loss of opportunities in integrating and 
applying product-related knowledge for technological developments (Reitzig & Wagner, 
2010; Weigelt, 2009). This opportunity cost is positively associated with tacitness of 
intellectual property and interdependence in the product architecture. Considering both 
governance and opportunity costs, the firm would choose supply chain-make when the 
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overall cost (sum of governance and opportunity costs) of supply chain-buy exceeds the 
overall cost of supply chain-make. 
 Figure 2 depicts the heuristic model of the relationship among cost (i.e., 
governance and opportunity costs) and the risk associated with the key theoretical 
variables in our framework. The horizontal axis in the graph represents the overall risk 
(R), which includes the risk of opportunism, supply risk, and risk of knowledge erosion. 
R is influenced by asset specificity (K), behavioral uncertainty (𝑈𝐵), supply risk (𝑅𝑆), 
tacitness of intellectual property (T), and interdependence in the product architecture (I). 
The vertical axis of the graph represents the overall cost, which includes both the 
governance and opportunity costs. Figure 2 shows that both costs of supply chain-make 
(C𝑀) and supply chain-buy (C𝐵) increase as risk (R) increases. At a low level of R, C𝑀 is 
higher than C𝐵. However, as the rate of increase of C𝐵 is steeper than that of C𝑀, C𝐵 
exceeds C𝑀 from the point A of overall risk. Therefore, the buying firm will choose 
supply chain-make when R is higher than A and choose supply chain-buy when R is 
lower than A. 
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Figure 2. The Heuristic Model of the Supply Chain Make-Buy Decision. Adapted from 
Chiles & McMackin (1996) and Williamson (1985) 
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Figure 3. The Heuristic Model of the Supply Chain-Make, Supply Chain-Buy, and Make. 
Adapted from Chiles & McMackin (1996) and Williamson (1985) 
 
Our study deliberately focuses on the supply chain-level make-buy decision 
assuming that the buying firm has already made a buy decision. However, it is also 
possible that the supply chain-level make-buy decision influences the firm-level make-
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buy decision itself. If the buying firm makes firm-level and supply chain-level make-buy 
decisions concurrently rather than sequentially, it would compare the costs of three 
options − supply chain-buy, supply chain-make, and make − and select the option with 
the lowest cost. Figure 3 presents an idealized heuristic model with the three options. 
Without considering the supply chain-make option, the buying firm will make the 
decision at point O, where the costs of traditional buy (C𝐵) and traditional make intersect. 
However, if the buying firm considers the supply chain-make option, it would choose 
supply chain-make between the two points A and B, where the cost of supply chain-make 
(C𝑀) is lower than both the costs of supply chain-buy (C𝐵) and hierarchy (C𝐻) (i.e., firm-
level make). Having the third option − supply chain-make − can shift the risk levels at 
which the managers make critical decisions and directly influence the choice between 
markets and hierarchies (Williamson, 1975). 
 
DISCUSSION 
We introduce the concept of supply chain make-buy and provide several key theoretical 
variables that can influence the buying firm’s supply chain make-buy decisions. The 
recent supply chain management literature calls for extending the firms’ attention into 
further upstream supply chains (Choi & Linton, 2011; Lee, 2010; Mena et al., 2013; 
Pagell, Wu, & Wasserman, 2010). By considering the supply chain-level make-buy 
decision beyond the firm-level make-buy decision, our study provides a basis for better 
understanding the firm’s decision to reach and control “multi-tier” (Mena et al., 2013) or 
“extended” (Lee, 2010) supply chains. Researchers have suggested several practical 
reasons for extending the buying firm’s control over multiple tiers of the supply chain 
  35 
(i.e., supply chain-make), including cost, innovation, and sustainability reasons (Choi & 
Linton, 2011; Lee, 2010). Building on TCE, the KBV, and structural-hole theory, we 
offer a theoretical framework that integrates different reasons for selecting supply chain-
make over supply chain-buy. 
 Our study contributes to the literature on make-buy decisions by considering the 
“bundle of transactions” as the unit-of-analysis and expanding the level of analysis from 
the dyadic context (i.e., direct transaction between the buying firm and top-tier supplier) 
to the multi-tier level (i.e., direct and indirect transactions among the buying firm, top-tier 
supplier, and lower-tier suppliers). The buy decision in the traditional make-buy entails 
the decision on which “supplier” performs the production activities. In contrast, the 
supply chain make-buy is about which “supply chain” to perform those activities. To 
“make” the supply chain, the buying firm has to exercise control over some lower-tier 
suppliers that lie beyond the top-tier suppliers. The existing literature on make-buy 
decision mainly focuses on transactions of the product between two exchange partners 
(e.g., John & Weitz, 1988; Parmigiani, 2007; Walker & Weber, 1984). The present study 
adds to this body of literature by providing a new perspective which considers the 
transactions throughout the supply chain involving the lower-tier suppliers. 
 The propositions and heuristic models in our paper offer a new perspective for 
organizing transactions to mitigate risks. Traditional ways of organizing transactions − 
vertical integration, contractual/relational governance, alliance, and joint venture − are 
the potential outcome of the transactional risk/opportunity assessments and the existing 
literature have examined these mechanisms with the focus on bilateral transactions 
(Geyskens et al., 2006; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Wever et al., 2012). By considering 
  36 
both direct, bilateral transactions and indirect transactions, our Propositions 1 and 2 divert 
from the traditional TCE literature’s predictions on organizing transactions. For example, 
without recognizing the supply chain-make option, the traditional TCE literature would 
suggest the buying firm adopting hierarchical governance when the transaction with the 
top-tier supplier is characterized by high asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, our supply chain make-buy model implies that the 
buying firm does not necessarily have to rely on hierarchical governance if it can reduce 
the risk of opportunism by engaging in supply chain-make. We also suggest that buying 
firms should assess asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty in both direct and indirect 
transactions. 
The traditional supply risk management literature suggests firms using additional 
supply sources, increase safety stock, or reduce capacity utilization under high supply 
uncertainty (Lee, 2002; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). However, Proposition 3 and our 
heuristic model suggest that the buying firm should first consider the supply chain-make 
option, before selecting costly redundancy or hedging strategies to manage supply risks 
(Sheffi & Rice, 2005). Propositions 4 and 5 also imply that the buying firm can utilize 
supply chain-make to partially take advantage of “learning by doing” (Adler & Clark, 
1991; Pisano, 1994; Von Hippel & Tyre, 1995) regarding technological developments 
and mitigate the risk of knowledge erosion instead of fully engaging in firm-level make 
or “make-and-buy” (Parmigiani, 2007). 
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Implications for Research and Managerial Practice 
A buying firm has the option of being involved in its top-tier supplier’s sourcing 
activities. Future research could investigate further the different archetypes of managerial 
control used for supply chain-make and how they could change the relationships among 
the buying firm, top-tier supplier, and lower-tier suppliers. The recent literature on the 
triadic relationships among the buying firm and suppliers has noted that changes in a 
dyadic relationship embedded in a triad would alter other relationships within the triad 
(e.g., Bastl et al., 2013; Choi & Wu, 2009; Mena et al., 2013). Since the use of control for 
supply chain-make would change the nature of multiple triadic relationships in the supply 
network, examining the effects of using the different archetypes introduced in our study 
would be a worthwhile endeavor. 
 Future studies should develop testable hypotheses from the propositions presented 
in our study. Researchers could utilize the measures developed by the literature built on 
TCE (Anderson, 1985; Heide & Stump, 1995; Walker & Weber, 1984) and the KBV 
(McEvily & Chakravarthy, 2002; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003) to 
conduct survey-based empirical studies. Researchers could also employ panel data on 
contractual buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Autry & Golicic, 2010; Banerjee, 
Dasgupta, & Kim, 2008), which would be essential for understanding how the key 
underlying variables suggested by our study shape the pattern of the relationships among 
the buying firms and lower-tier suppliers. Behavioral investigations are another path to 
empirically evaluating our propositions. Since our propositions are about managers’ 
decision making, scenario-based role-playing experiments (Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & 
Eckerd, 2011) could be applied to understand how the managers make supply chain-level 
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make-buy decisions. In addition to the variables presented in our study, identifying the 
potential biases that influence supply chain make-buy decision making could further 
facilitate theoretical development. 
 For managers, our study provides a guideline for making the choice between 
supply chain-make and supply chain-buy. It also offers some suggestions for managing 
multiple tiers of the supply network, if their decision is supply chain-make. Events such 
as the Tazreen factory fire in Bangladesh and the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
remind the importance of careful selection and management of the lower-tier suppliers. 
However, since supply chain-make incurs additional governance costs of managing the 
relationships with the selected lower-tier suppliers, managers should compare the costs 
and strategic benefits of supply chain-make and supply chain-buy under different 
circumstances. 
Asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and supply risk can increase the cost of 
managing exchange relationships with the top-tier suppliers. In addition, under high 
tacitness of intellectual property and interdependence in the product architecture, supply 
chain-buy can quickly erode the firm’s opportunities for technological developments. 
Considering these variables will help the managers make the right supply chain make-buy 
decision. In the wake of Tazreen factory fire and Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, 
Walmart recognized threatening behavioral uncertainty and supply risk from both top-tier 
and lower-tier garment suppliers and significantly increased the scope of supply chain-
make in garment category (Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2015). However, rather than being 
reactive to these disruptive events, we urge managers to proactively assess the key 
variables in our paper and engage in supply chain-make accordingly. We provide a few 
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useful ways of controlling the component sourcing that the managers can choose from 
and make some suggestions for how managers may be able to adopt the directed 
sourcing, AVL, strategic alliance, and collaborative relationship. We also point out how 
the implementation of these strategies will depend on the relative power of the top-tier 
suppliers and formalization of the relationships with the lower-tier suppliers. Our 
framework for supply chain make-buy will help managers make decisions regarding 
when and how extensively to engage in supply chain-make. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TO DELEGATE OR CONTROL? A BEHAVIORAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
MULTI-TIER SOURCING DECISION 
 
ABSTRACT 
Whether to delegate full responsibility to a Tier-1 supplier or retain partial control over 
subcomponent sourcing in lower-tier suppliers is a critical decision for supply mangers. 
Full delegation is efficient, while partial control helps mitigate supply chain risks. We 
examine the economic and behavioral factors that influence individual supply managers’ 
decision-making when faced with such multi-tier sourcing decisions. A behavioral 
experiment of 259 supply managers tests the effects of these variables on the extent and 
mode of multi-tier sourcing interventions. Results suggest that supply managers exert less 
multi-tier control when they have high levels of interpersonal trust in the sales 
representatives, an effect accentuated by familiarity with suppliers in the lower-tiers. 
Behavioral uncertainty of the Tier-1 supplier leads to higher extent of multi-tier control 
only when the supply manager has high levels of familiarity with potential suppliers at 
Tier-2 and below. 
Keywords: multi-tier sourcing, sourcing strategy, behavioral experiment 
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic sourcing and supply base reduction methodologies have seen Tier-1 suppliers 
assume significant sourcing responsibilities on behalf of their customers, extending into 
the selection and management of lower-tier (Tier-2 and below) suppliers. High profile 
incidents like Boeing 787 delays, Rana Plaza collapse, and BP oil spill have led firms to 
reevaluate the role of Tier-1 suppliers in their supply chains. In response, buyers are 
increasingly using multi-tier sourcing practices such as approved vendor list and directed 
sourcing in an effort to re-exert control over lower-tier suppliers (Choi & Linton, 2011; 
Lee, 2010; Mena, Humphries, & Choi, 2013). However, the experience these firms 
suggests limited insights about how and when to apply these practices. 
Multi-tier sourcing is a strategic decision that influences the firm’s supply 
network structure. Benefits may include aiding in controlling supplier performance (Choi 
& Hong, 2002; Mena et al., 2013), access to technological and market information (Choi 
& Linton, 2011), and helping develop sustainable supply chains (Lee, 2010). However, 
multi-tier sourcing also requires more time and effort from individual supply managers 
and may increase relational tensions in buyer-supplier relationships (Choi & Hong, 2002; 
Mena et al., 2013). While previous literature has examined other types of strategic 
sourcing decisions made by individual supply managers like make-buy (e.g., Mantel, 
Tatikonda, & Liao, 2006) and supplier selection (e.g., de Boer & van der Wegen, 2003; 
Kull, Oke, & Dooley, 2014), the role of supply managers as the key instigators of multi-
tier sourcing decision has remained underexplored. As the behavioral agents that make 
decisions on behalf of their firms (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), supply managers are 
incentivized to increase firm performance, but they are also subject to heuristics and 
  42 
cognitive biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This study examines the economic and 
behavioral factors that influence a supply manager’s multi-tier sourcing decision-making. 
When making multi-tier sourcing decisions, supply managers need to consider 
when to apply the practices and how much control to exert. On the former, we build on 
information economics and behavioral decision theories to examine the key factors that 
affect a supply manager’s decision: behavioral uncertainty regarding the Tier-1 supplier’s 
performance, the supply manager’s familiarity with the suppliers in the lower-tier of the 
supply base, and the level of interpersonal trust between the supply manager and the Tier-
1 supplier’s sales representative. On the latter question, we consider two complementary 
elements of multi-tier control over subcomponent sourcing: one regarding the extent of 
bill-of-materials cost controlled by the buyer; and the other regarding the choice of 
governance mode, ranging from the use of approved vendor lists (suggested or mandated) 
to directed sourcing. When using an approved vendor list, a buyer requires Tier-1 
suppliers to select their suppliers only from the list of vendors approved by the buyer 
(Choi & Hong, 2002; Choi & Linton, 2011). Such an approach is used extensively by 
leading aircraft and aircraft engine manufacturers with their Tier-1 suppliers (Boeing, 
2015; Lockheed Martin, 2015; Northrop Grumman, 2015). In a directed sourcing 
arrangement, a buyer negotiates directly with lower-tier suppliers regarding pricing and 
other specifications and directs Tier-1 suppliers to work with them (Choi & Hong, 2002; 
Mena et al., 2013; Park & Hartley, 2002). For instance, Apple devotes considerable 
resources to work intensively in this manner with a selected number of lower-tier 
suppliers (Apple Inc., 2015; Satariano & Burrows, 2011). 
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Our study makes a number of contributions. First, we are the first study, as far as 
we are aware, that examines the dynamics of how supply managers make decisions in 
this emerging, but increasingly important, context of multi-tier sourcing. In doing so, we 
provide guidance to supply managers on the efficient use of multi-tier sourcing. Second, 
previous studies on multi-tier sourcing decisions have focused on the drivers at the 
organizational level. Our experimental design focuses on the individual level of unit of 
analysis and help shed light on the behavioral tendencies of the instigators of these 
decisions, the individual supply manager. Third, we contribute to the supply chain 
literature by extending the focus to consider not only direct bilateral transactions with a 
Tier-1 supplier, but also the indirect transactions with lower-tier suppliers. This extended 
view of transaction analysis allows us to consider various conditions and ways of 
governing transactions. 
We develop a behavioral experiment with 259 supply managers to test our 
hypotheses of interest. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: we review the 
literature in the second section, discuss methods in the third section, while the fourth 
section overviews the results. We discuss the findings with respect to multi-tier sourcing 
control via extent of responsibility and mode of control in the fifth section. We conclude 
with implications for managers and the literature. 
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
Multi-Tier Sourcing as a Response to Information Asymmetry 
The trends of outsourcing, supply-base reduction, and reliance on strategic suppliers have 
seen Tier-1 suppliers play an increasingly central role in the management of their 
customers’ supply chains (Choi & Linton, 2011; Rossetti & Choi, 2005). Their direct 
exchange relationships with Tier-2 suppliers means they possess more information about 
the nature of lower-tier supply chains than supply managers of buying companies 
(Mishra, Heide, & Cort, 1998). For example, Tier-1 suppliers have greater insights on 
subcomponent cost, quality, capacity, supply risks, and technological development. 
Without direct ties between supply managers and Tier-2 suppliers, Tier-1 suppliers can 
take information broker positions and benefit from information asymmetry by selectively 
transferring upstream supply chain information to the supply managers of the buyers 
(Burt, 1992; Li & Choi, 2009). Critical sub-suppliers may also be several tiers removed 
from focal firms (Lee, 2010; Yan, Choi, Kim, & Yang, 2015). Because information 
search is costly (Stigler, 1961) and individuals have different search costs (Salop, 1977; 
Salop & Stiglitz, 1977), information asymmetry and associated problems such as moral 
hazard, opportunism, and adverse selection are prevalent among economic actors 
(Akerlof, 1970; Hölmstrom, 1979; Williamson, 1985). 
Multi-tier sourcing or “extended” supply management practices have been 
suggested as one way of managing the uncertainty arising from information asymmetry in 
this context (e.g., Choi & Linton, 2011; Lee, 2010; Mena et al., 2013; New, 2010). In 
highlighting the dangers of delegating management of lower-tier suppliers to Tier-1 
suppliers, Choi and Linton (2011) suggest that buyers should directly manage key lower-
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tier suppliers by retaining control over the bill-of-materials and maintaining close 
relationships with key lower-tier suppliers. New (2010) discusses the use of information 
technologies to monitor and disclose information regarding direct and indirect suppliers 
in response to consumer pressures for product provenance. In case studies in the food 
industry, Mena et al. (2013) suggest that a closed supply chain structure comprised of 
direct relationships between buyers and Tier-2 suppliers provides the sense of 
interdependence and stability to supply chain members. However, engaging in multi-tier 
sourcing is not costless and requires additional managerial resources and efforts from 
individual supply managers (Mena et al., 2013). The firm incurs higher information 
search costs to identify and monitor potential lower-tier suppliers to be included in 
approved vendor lists or directed sourcing arrangements. For example, Apple regularly 
audit selected lower-tier suppliers to gain insights on potential sustainability risks 
embedded in their supply chain (Apple Inc., 2015). While directed sourcing can provide 
more centralized subcomponent sourcing control, it typically requires more managerial 
resources than using approved vendor lists. 
The next subsection develops our theoretical framework exploring how the 
reliance on multi-tier sourcing practices is influenced by the supply manager’s 
expectations of behavioral uncertainty of the Tier-1 supplier, their inter-personal trust 
with supplier’s salesperson, and their familiarity with potential suppliers at Tier-2 and 
below. Figure 4 outlines these relationships. 
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Figure 4. Theoretical Model 
 
Behavioral Uncertainty and the Intensity of Multi-Tier Sourcing  
Behavioral uncertainty refers to the difficulty of assuring an exchange partner’s 
performance or adherence to established agreements (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 
2006; John & Weitz, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Higher levels of behavioral uncertainty 
increase the risk of opportunistic behaviors by the exchange partner (Williamson, 1985). 
Supply managers are the behavioral agents who manage exchange relationships with 
suppliers (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), and as such the behavioral uncertainty 
exhibited by a supplier will influence their perceptions of risk in that relationship. 
Behavioral uncertainty of a Tier-1 supplier may be associated with multiple performance 
criteria including cost, quality, flexibility, and sustainability. In this paper, we focus on 
behavioral uncertainty regarding the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance. Cost 
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performance is typically the most salient performance criterion for individual supply 
managers, so behavioral uncertainty of the supplier on this dimension represents a direct 
employment risk or may adversely affect other performance-related rewards (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Choi and Hong (2002) observe that cost considerations are the 
dominant reason for adopting multi-tier sourcing practices in the automotive industry. 
When faced with uncertainty, the behavioral decision theory literature suggests 
that individuals first seek to reduce uncertainty through information search (Berger & 
Calabrese, 1975; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). While the supply manager may seek cost-
related information from the Tier-1 supplier, the supplier’s role as an information broker 
between the firm and the lower-tier suppliers gives rise to information asymmetry and the 
threat of opportunism (Burt, 1992). In response, firms may seek to validate that 
information, or generate additional information, by engaging third parties (Janis & Mann, 
1977). In our setting, engaging with suppliers at Tier-2, or below, through multi-tier 
sourcing practices allows supply managers to exert greater control over the selection of 
suppliers, and to reduce information asymmetry and behavioral uncertainty by acquiring 
cost-related information directly. Hence, we propose that the supply manager will 
increase the intensity of multi-tier sourcing under conditions of high behavioral 
uncertainty on Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance.  
H1: Behavioral uncertainty regarding the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance increases 
the intensity of multi-tier sourcing. 
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Interpersonal Trust and the Intensity of Multi-Tier Sourcing 
The role of trust in reducing perceived information asymmetry and behavioral uncertainty 
in interpersonal relationships has received a great deal of attention (e.g., Kollock, 1994; 
Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Trust has been 
conceptualized as confidence or predictability in the counterpart’s behavior or goodwill 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zucker, 1986; Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust in someone enables 
individuals to act as if behavioral uncertainty or information asymmetry in the 
relationship is reduced (Tomkins, 2001). From a supply manager’s perspective, trust in 
the exchange relationship with a Tier-1 supplier can exist at two different levels—
interorganizational and interpersonal levels (Zaheer et al., 1998). Interorganizational trust 
and interpersonal trust are related, but they are two distinct concepts that can influence 
exchange relationships differently (Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Interpersonal trust can reduce the supply manager’s perceived behavioral 
uncertainty in the exchange relationship by facilitating mutual obligations and making it 
easier to monitor the partner’s behaviors (Moran, 2005). For a supply manager, the level 
of interpersonal trust in the relationship with the sales representative of the Tier-1 
supplier can be perceived as an essential representation of reduced behavioral 
uncertainty. As interpersonal trust reduces efforts for controls such as rules and 
monitoring (De Jong & Elfring, 2010; Dirks, 1999), a supply manager who trusts the 
sales representative of the Tier-1 supplier may decrease reliance on controlling 
mechanisms including multi-tier sourcing. 
Moreover, using local representativeness heuristic, supply managers may 
extrapolate the level of interpersonal trust to the level of the inter-organizational 
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relationship (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Local 
representativeness arises as people have a tendency to believe that “small samples are 
highly representative of the populations from which they are drawn” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974: 1125-1126). For example, people tend to extrapolate their evaluation of 
student teachers’ performances in practice lessons to the predictions of the teachers’ 
future teaching performances (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Investors may also 
misattribute a small sample of favorable descriptions of companies as good 
representations of their future returns (Chen, Kim, Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007). As the 
salesperson is the most salient indicator of their organization’s trustworthiness, the 
greater the interpersonal trust, the greater confidence the supply manager has in the Tier-
1 supplier. Consequently, they may engage in reduced efforts in monitoring and 
safeguarding (Villena, Revilla, & Choi, 2011), and consequently, a decreased intensity of 
multi-tier sourcing.  
H2: Interpersonal trust in the Tier-1 supplier’s sales representative decreases the intensity 
of multi-tier sourcing. 
 
Familiarity and the Intensity of Multi-Tier Sourcing  
Applying information economics, scholars have associated familiarity to potential 
exchange partners or investment options with lower information search cost and 
facilitated investments in exchange relationships (Huberman, 2001; Ke, Ng, & Wang, 
2010; Massa & Simonov, 2006; Reuer, Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013). Reuer et al. (2013) 
suggest that executives’ familiarity with foreign firms’ resources reduces perceived risk 
of adverse selection and promotes international joint ventures or acquisitions. Huberman 
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(2001) observes that shareholders tend to invest in the stocks of the familiar companies. 
Ke et al. (2010) also find that fund managers prefer to invest in the familiar companies 
with a local presence. Massa and Simonov (2006) argue that investors mostly invest in 
familiar stocks because familiarity is regarded as the proxy for information and lowers 
cost of information access. In the same vein, collecting information directly from 
potential lower-tier suppliers can be easier for a supply manager who is already familiar 
with those lower-tier suppliers. In this study, we also investigate whether the supply 
manager’s familiarity with potential lower-tier suppliers influences the manager’s multi-
tier sourcing decision. 
As multi-tier sourcing practices typically require more resources and managerial 
efforts from the buyer (Mena et al., 2013), supply managers would prefer to engage in 
multi-tier sourcing when it is perceived to be less costly to do so. In interorganizational 
exchange relationships, familiarity with exchange partners can reduce information search 
cost and promote investments in the relationships (Huberman, 2001; Ke, Ng, & Wang, 
2010; Massa & Simonov, 2006; Reuer, Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013). To initiate 
collaborative relationships, a company needs to reliably assess its exchange partners’ 
performance (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). In the context of the multi-tier 
sourcing decision-making, a supply manager’s familiarity with the potential suppliers at 
Tier-2 and below (lower-tier familiarity) can reduce the cost of acquiring information 
about the subcomponents and lower-tier suppliers to be included in the approved vendor 
list or directed sourcing arrangement. If the supply manager is not familiar with the 
potential lower-tier suppliers, it will require even more managerial efforts to acquire 
information about them and reliably assess their performance. Therefore, when faced 
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with high behavioral uncertainty from the Tier-1 supplier, it will be easier for the supply 
manager who is more familiar with the potential lower-tier suppliers to increase the 
extent of multi-tier sourcing. In contrast, the supply manager with little familiarity with 
the potential lower-tier suppliers would find it more difficult and therefore less likely to 
increase the intensity of multi-tier sourcing even when perceived behavioral uncertainty 
from the Tier-1 supplier is high. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Lower-tier familiarity moderates the relationship between behavioral uncertainty 
and the intensity of multi-tier sourcing, such that the relationship is more positive 
when lower-tier familiarity is high. 
We also expect that lower-tier familiarity would moderate the effect of 
interpersonal trust on the intensity of multi-tier sourcing. If supply managers do not 
clearly distinguish interorganizational trust from interpersonal trust due to 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), interpersonal trust would have 
a significant negative effect on the intensity of multi-tier sourcing, as hypothesized in H2. 
Then, supply managers who are already familiar with potential lower-tier suppliers can 
increase the extent of multi-tier sourcing when they personally distrust sales 
representatives of Tier-1 suppliers. In contrast, the search cost for engaging in multi-tier 
sourcing would be higher for the supply managers with low lower-tier familiarity, and 
therefore, it would be more difficult for them to increase the intensity of multi-tier 
sourcing even when they personally distrust their counterparts from Tier-1 suppliers. 
Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
  52 
H4:  Lower-tier familiarity moderates the relationship between interpersonal trust and the 
intensity of multi-tier sourcing, such that the relationship is more negative when 
lower-tier familiarity is high. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
We utilized an experimental vignette methodology (EVM), also known as a scenario-
based role-playing experiment (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & 
Eckerd, 2011; Weber, 1992). EVM is used to enhance experimental realism while also 
manipulating and controlling independent variables, hence preserving both internal and 
external validity of the experiment (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014). EVM is particularly 
useful when “it is difficult to experimentally manipulate sensitive topics in an ethical 
manner” (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014: 357). Since EVM utilizes hypothetical scenarios, it 
can address sensitive topics. Decisions regarding multi-tier sourcing inevitably involve 
confidential information of the buying companies and suppliers. Moreover, the 
complexity of real life supply networks means that field or laboratory experiments are not 
feasible. Therefore, EVM is well suited to the context of our study. 
We used a 23 full-factorial model as the design of our experiment, resulting in 
eight scenarios in which the manipulated variables are behavioral uncertainty, 
interpersonal trust, and lower-tier familiarity. The experiment was executed using self-
administered on-line questionnaires with actual supply managers as participants. Each 
participant of the experiment was given one of the eight scenarios with either high or low 
levels of each manipulated variable. At the end of the scenario, each participant was 
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asked to choose the intensity of multi-tier sourcing in terms of the extent and mode 
described in the Variables subsection. 
 
Sample and Data Collection 
To establish face validity of the scenarios and questionnaire of our experiment, we first 
interviewed four supply managers working in the United States, South Korea, and China 
on their use of multi-tier sourcing practices. Based on the interviews and our theoretical 
argumentation, we developed the research instrument and shared it with the same four 
supply managers to receive feedback. We then administered three phases of pilot tests to 
improve the validity of our instrument. First, we conducted a small-scale pretest 
involving 16 master’s students enrolled in a supply chain management course in the 
United Kingdom. After incorporating this feedback, we tested and analyzed the revised 
instrument with 69 senior undergraduate students and 123 MBA students taking supply 
chain management courses at three large universities across the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Finally, we collected data and feedback from 30 practicing supply 
chain managers from ten different companies. 
To ensure that the participants detected the differences between high and low 
experimental treatments of the variables in the scenarios, we performed manipulation 
checks during the process of pilot testing (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011; Rungtusanatham 
et al., 2011). The results of the t-tests comparing high and low levels of behavioral 
uncertainty (t = -8.030, p < 0.001), interpersonal trust (t = -9.540, p < 0.001), and lower-
tier familiarity (t = -5.768, p < 0.001) strongly support that the participants could detect 
the manipulations of the experimental factors in the scenarios. 
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Our study focuses on individual supply managers’ decision-making regarding 
multi-tier sourcing. Therefore, we targeted actual supply managers as the participants of 
the experiment. The sample was drawn from the members of the Institute for Supply 
Management (ISM). Members were contacted by e-mail with a link to the online 
experiment and survey instrument. To motivate participation, $25 Amazon online gift 
cards were distributed to sixty randomly selected participants who completed the online 
experiment. 465 members of ISM agreed to participate, and 321 completed the survey. 
Excluding responses with missing values (56) or participants who indicated no supply 
management experience (6), 259 usable responses were received. Participants, on 
average, had 23 years of work experience and 14 years of experience in supply 
management. The final sample was 30% female, and the average age was 46. 58% of the 
participants were professionals in manufacturing industries, and 42% were in service 
industries. The average firm size of the participants was 10,632. 
We also checked whether the randomly distributed eight scenarios are confounded 
with the demographics of our sample. The results of the ANOVA tests indicate that the 
eight scenarios are not confounded with firm size (F = 0.988, p > 0.05), work experience 
(F = 1.325, p > 0.05), personal risk propensity (F = 1.528, p > 0.05), or age (F = 1.381, p 
> 0.05). 
 
Variables 
Intensity of multi-tier sourcing. We use two proxies to assess our dependent variable, the 
intensity of multi-tier sourcing. The first proxy—extent of multi-tier sourcing 
management—is a seven-point Likert scale where participants indicated the degree of 
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direct subcomponent sourcing control that they wish to exercise over the Tier-1 supplier. 
The seven options range from full control by the Tier-1 supplier to full control by the 
buyer. Our second proxy—mode of multi-tier sourcing—was an ordered categorical 
variable based on the degree of the buyer’s centralized control over lower-tier suppliers. 
Participants were asked to select one of three options: a suggested approved vendor list (1 
= low control), a mandated approved vendor list (2 = intermediate control), and directed 
sourcing (3 = high control). 
Behavioral uncertainty. We operationalize behavioral uncertainty as the perceived 
degree of difficulty in securing the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance. We manipulate 
the scenarios with two conditions. The first treatment condition is where the supply 
manager faces difficulty in securing the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance (high 
behavioral uncertainty), while the second treatment condition is where the supply 
manager is confident in the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance (low behavioral 
uncertainty). 
Interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust between the supply manager and sales 
representative of the Tier-1 supplier is manipulated by adapting the behavioral 
experiment by Dirks (1999) and the interpersonal trust measure used by Zaheer et al. 
(1998). The two treatment conditions for interpersonal trust describe the situations where 
the supply manager personally trusts (high interpersonal trust) or distrusts (low 
interpersonal trust) the sales representative of the Tier-1 supplier. 
Lower-tier familiarity. Our moderator variable is the supply manager’s familiarity 
with potential suppliers at Tier-2 and below. Our manipulations are in line with previous 
work incorporating this construct in behavioral experiment studies by Hada, Grewal, and 
  56 
Lilien, (2013) and Reuer et al. (2013). The two treatment conditions represent the 
circumstances where the supply manager has high (or low) levels of familiarity and 
experience of working with potential suppliers at Tier-2 and below. 
Control variables. To address potential confounds we include a number of control 
variables, including the participant’s personal risk propensity, years of work experience, 
current industry, firm size (natural log of the number of employees), and age. Personal 
risk propensity assesses individuals’ risk-taking behavior, and is included in the study as 
it may alter their choice regarding the intensity with which multi-tier sourcing 
management is applied. The multi-item scale is adapted from Meertens and Lion (2008), 
and has a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.69. Years of work experience and age are also included 
because individuals’ risk-taking behavior changes over time (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) 
and decision-makers rely on past experiences of successful decisions (Riedl, Kaufmann, 
Zimmermann, & Perols, 2013). Although our experiment is based on hypothetical 
scenarios, we control for industry as multi-tier practices can differ across sectors and firm 
size to reflect the managerial resources available for exercising such practices.  
 
Analysis 
Tables 4 provides the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for the extent of 
multi-tier sourcing management, while Table 5 illustrates the result of the ordered 
logistics regression for mode of multi-tier sourcing. H1 predicted that greater behavioral 
uncertainty would lead to more intensity of multi-tier sourcing management. We find 
mixed support, with no significant main effect on the extent of multi-tier sourcing (B = 
0.11, p > 0.05), but significant increase in the likelihood of sourcing control mode by the 
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buyer (B = 0.27, p < 0.05). For H2 we find that interpersonal trust in the Tier-1 supplier’s 
sales representative significantly decreases both the extent of multi-tier sourcing 
management (B = -0.27, p < 0.01) and the degree of centralized control mode adopted (B 
= -0.41, p < 0.01). Regarding H3 and H4, there is a positive interaction between lower-
tier familiarity and behavioral uncertainty (B = 0.286, P < 0.01) and a negative 
interaction between lower-tier familiarity and interpersonal trust (B = -0.280, p < 0.01) 
for extent of multi-tier sourcing. No significant interaction effects were found for the 
mode of multi-tier sourcing. Figure 5 shows that the positive effect of behavioral 
uncertainty on the extent of multi-tier sourcing is stronger when the supply manager is 
familiar with potential suppliers at Tier-2 or below. While behavioral uncertainty does 
not have a significant effect on the extent of multi-tier sourcing when lower-tier 
familiarity is low (B = -0.18, p > 0.1), it has a significant positive effect under high 
lower-tier familiarity (B = 0.39, p < 0.01). Similarly, Figure 6 illustrates that the negative 
impact of interpersonal trust on the extent of multi-tier sourcing is strengthened under 
high familiarity with indirect suppliers. Under the low level of lower-tier familiarity, the 
effect of interpersonal trust on the extent of multi-tier sourcing is not significant (B = -
0.01, p > 0.1). In contrast, interpersonal trust significantly decreases the extent of multi-
tier sourcing at the high level of lower-tier familiarity (B = -0.55, p < 0.001). 
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Table 3 
Correlation and Descriptive Statistics 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Behavioral Uncertainty 1     
2. Tier-2 Familiarity 0.004 1    
3. Interpersonal Trust -0.003 -0.012 1   
4. Extent of Multi-Tier Sourcing 0.067 -0.050 -0.157* 1  
5. Mode of Multi-Tier Sourcing 0.124* 0.091 -0.185* 0.194* 1 
6. Personal Risk Propensity 0.103 0.099 -0.015 -0.054 -0.079 
7. Work Experience -0.001 -0.156* -0.105 -0.062 -0.111 
8. Industry -0.057 0.081 0.046 -0.053 0.120 
9. Firm Size -0.048 -0.109 -0.007 -0.175* -0.172* 
10. Age 0.038 -0.128* -0.123* 0.030 -0.098 
Mean 0.042 0.004 -0.019 3.969 2.112 
Standard Deviation 1.001 1.002 1.002 1.532 0.806 
 
 6 7 8 9 10 
6. Personal Risk Propensity 1     
7. Work Experience 0.025 1    
8. Industry 0.041 -0.209* 1   
9. Firm Size -0.202* -0.022 0.081 1  
10. Age 0.019 0.838* -0.198* -0.059 1 
Mean 4.143 23.768 0.575 7.325 46.216 
Standard Deviation 1.262 12.066 0.495 2.161 11.330 
          * p < 0.05 
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Table 4 
Regression Results Predicting the Extent of Multi-Tier Sourcing 
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Extent of Multi-Tier Sourcing Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
(Constant) 5.627*** 0.622 5.790*** 0.617 5.862*** 0.596 
Control variables    
Industry (mfg. = 1, service = 0) -0.124 0.193 -0.087 0.191 -0.069 0.185 
Firm size (ln number of employees) -0.134** 0.044 -0.141** 0.044 -0.154*** 0.043 
Age 0.033* 0.015 0.030* 0.015 0.029* 0.014 
Work experience (years) -0.036* 0.014 -0.036* 0.014 -0.033* 0.014 
  Risk propensity -0.166† 0.086 -0.170* 0.085 -0.178* 0.082 
Experimental variables       
Behavioral uncertainty (H1)   0.084 0.092 0.111 0.089 
Interpersonal trust (H2)   -0.248** 0.092 -0.273** 0.090 
Tier-2 familiarity   -0.122 0.094 -0.139 0.090 
Interactions       
Familiarity*Uncertainty (H3)     0.286** 0.090 
Familiarity*Trust (H4)     -0.280** 0.089 
R2 0.070 0.104  0.172 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.075  0.138 
R2 change  0.024*  0.068*** 
F-statistic 3.80 3.63  5.14 
N 259 259  259 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
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Figure 5. Interaction between Lower-Tier Familiarity and Behavioral Uncertainty 
 
 
Figure 6: Interaction between Lower-Tier Familiarity and Interpersonal Trust 
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Table 5 
Ordered Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Mode of Multi-Tier Sourcing 
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mode of Multi-Tier Sourcing Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
Control variables    
Industry (mfg. = 1, service = 0) 0.507* 0.243 0.598* 0.249 0.589* 0.249 
Firm size (ln number of employees) -0.188** 0.057 -0.196** 0.059 -0.196* 0.059 
Age -0.005 0.019 -0.011 0.019 -0.011 0.019 
Work experience (years) -0.009 0.017 -0.007 0.018 -0.007 0.018 
  Risk propensity -0.177 0.109 -0.201† 0.111 -.0201† 0.110 
Experimental variables       
Behavioral uncertainty (H1)   0.262* 0.119 0.274* 0.120 
Interpersonal trust (H2)   -0.408** 0.121 -0.413** 0.122 
Tier-2 familiarity   0.093 0.120 0.093 0.121 
Interactions       
Familiarity*Uncertainty (H3)     0.034 0.120 
Familiarity*Trust (H4)     -0.083 0.119 
Log-likelihood -273.171 -264.490  -264.209 
𝜒2 17.75 35.11  35.67 
𝜒2 difference  17.36***  0.56 
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.062  0.063 
N 259 259  259 
† p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our study contributes to the emerging supply chain practice of multi-tier sourcing (Choi 
& Linton, 2011; Lee, 2010; Mena et al., 2013; New, 2010; Yan et al., 2015). Previous 
literature has pointed to the role of different performance objectives (e.g., sustainability, 
technology, and cost) (Choi & Linton, 2011) or relative procurement competence 
between the buyer and supplier (Brewer, Ashenbaum, & Carter, 2013) in the adoption of 
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multi-tier sourcing practices. Our paper focuses on the decision-making of individual 
supply managers, who typically have significant discretion over selection and 
management of lower-tier suppliers. By investigating the intensity of multi-tier sourcing 
by individual supply managers in response to behavioral uncertainty, interpersonal trust, 
and familiarity with lower-tier suppliers, our study contributes to the growing stream of 
work in this area. 
Regarding the role of behavioral uncertainty, the results suggest that supply 
managers select the mode of multi-tier sourcing with more centralized control when they 
perceive higher behavioral uncertainty. In contrast, behavioral uncertainty does not have 
a significant main effect on the extent of multi-tier sourcing control. This result implies 
that supply managers try to cope with the uncertainty in their Tier-1 suppliers’ cost 
performance by focusing on exerting direct control over specific lower-tier suppliers 
through directed sourcing or mandating approved vendor lists rather than trying to control 
a broader set of lower-tier suppliers. Since controlling a large proportion of 
subcomponents and pertinent lower-tier suppliers can be burdensome for supply 
managers, those who are faced with high behavioral uncertainty seem to select the mode 
of multi-tier sourcing with more strict control without necessarily increasing the extent of 
multi-tier sourcing control. 
The level of a supply manager’s interpersonal trust in the sales representative of 
the Tier-1 supplier has a significant and negative effect on both the extent and mode of 
multi-tier sourcing management. This finding is intriguing since it suggests that a 
relational factor (i.e., interpersonal trust) plays a more important role than an economic 
driver (i.e., behavioral uncertainty) in making multi-tier sourcing decisions. It may be 
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reflective of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), where supply managers seem to extrapolate interpersonal trust in the 
sales representative of the Tier-1 supplier to the trust in the overall organization. This 
finding is consistent with prior literature suggesting the relationships between individuals 
are an important factor in supply chain governance (Gligor & Autry, 2012; Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002). 
With regard to our moderation hypotheses, we show that under conditions where 
the supply manager is highly familiar with potential lower-tier suppliers, they will 
significantly increase the extent of multi-tier sourcing control as behavioral uncertainty 
moves from low to high. By contrast, we see no difference in the extent of multi-tier 
sourcing control when the supply manager has low familiarity, regardless of the degree of 
behavioral uncertainty. This finding highlights the importance of familiarity with lower-
tier suppliers in multi-tier sourcing decision-making: it enables the supply manager to 
increase the buyer’s control over the selection and management of Tier-2 suppliers to 
deal with behavioral uncertainty of the Tier-1 supplier. Similarly, when behavioral 
uncertainty of the Tier-1 supplier is low, lower-tier familiarity allows supply managers to 
reduce the scope of their intervention, conserving valuable managerial time and attention. 
This finding supports the research pointing to the importance of building supply market 
intelligence in making effective decisions (Handfield, 2006). 
Lower-tier familiarity also strengthens the impact of interpersonal trust. Relative 
to low lower-tier familiarity condition, supply managers with high lower-tier familiarity 
are more willing to delegate sourcing responsibility to the Tier-1 supplier as the level of 
interpersonal trust in the sales representative increases. 
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Theoretical Implications 
Our findings suggest that individual supply managers’ decisions regarding the use 
of multi-tier sourcing practices are subject to several key heuristics. First, when faced 
with uncertainty in the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance, supply managers try to reduce 
uncertainty by exercising greater control over subcomponent sourcing and minimizing 
information asymmetry between the buyer and the Tier-1 supplier. This finding is in line 
with the reduce part of the R.Q.P. (reduce, quantify, and plug) heuristic suggested by 
behavioral decision theories (Janis & Mann, 1977; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Second, 
supply managers tend to be influenced more saliently by interpersonal-level trust than 
interorganizational-level behavioral uncertainty when they make multi-tier sourcing 
decisions. This finding indicates the presence of a representative heuristic (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) in such decision-making. Lastly, while 
supply managers use multi-tier sourcing practices to cope with perceived uncertainty in 
the relationship with the Tier-1 supplier, the extent of use is subject to their familiarity 
with potential Tier-2 suppliers. As familiarity can reduce perceived search cost (Reuer, 
Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013), supply managers who are familiar with potential Tier-2 
suppliers adjust the extent of multi-tier sourcing more sensitively according to the 
perceived level of behavioral uncertainty and interpersonal trust in the relationship with 
the Tier-1 supplier. 
Our study also provides theoretical implications to the literature on make-buy 
decisions. For supply managers, the decision regarding direct control over lower-tier 
suppliers using multi-tier sourcing practices can be understood as the ‘supply chain 
make-buy’ decision—should they ‘make’ the supply chains of a purchased item by 
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controlling the selection and management of lower-tier suppliers or ‘buy’ the supply 
chains by delegating control to a Tier-1 supplier? The traditional transaction cost 
economics (TCE) literature mostly considers bilateral transactions between two economic 
entities as the unit of analysis (Geyskens et al., 2006; Wever et al., 2012; Williamson, 
1975). As a result, the literature on make-buy decisions adopting TCE also has focused 
on the factors embedded in bilateral transactions (e.g., asset specificity and behavioral 
uncertainty in the exchange relationship with a supply chain partner). Our study, from a 
buyer’s perspective, considers not only direct bilateral transaction decisions with a Tier-1 
supplier but also indirect transaction decisions with Tier-2 suppliers. We argue that 
supply managers make multi-tier sourcing decisions by considering the factors embedded 
in not only direct transactions with a Tier-1 supplier (e.g., behavioral uncertainty and 
interpersonal trust) but also indirect transactions with potential lower-tier suppliers 
(lower-tier familiarity). This extended view of transaction analysis allows us to consider 
various conditions and ways of governing transactions. For instance, when behavioral 
uncertainty of a Tier-1 supplier is high but that of certain Tier-2 suppliers is low, the 
buyer can make subcomponent sourcing decisions on behalf of the Tier-1 supplier. In 
contrast, when a Tier-1 supplier’s performance is reliable and the nature of Tier-2 
suppliers is unknown, the buyer can delegate subcomponent sourcing to the Tier-1 
supplier. These various potential arrangements of multi-tier transactions call for further 
developments in the literature on make-buy decisions to consider both direct and indirect 
transactions when analyzing transaction costs. 
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Managerial Implications 
Our study provides practical implications to buying companies that implement 
multi-tier sourcing practices. We shed light on the conditions under which these 
practices, such as directed sourcing and approved vendor lists are more likely to be used 
by supply managers to control the actions of their Tier-1 suppliers and lower-tier supply 
chains. Yet, the use of multi-tier sourcing practices also requires more managerial 
resources and may aggravate relational tensions between buying companies and their 
Tier-1 suppliers (Choi & Hong, 2002; Mena et al., 2013). Balancing these trade-offs 
between control and sourcing efficiency is a difficult challenge for supply managers. 
The result of our experiment suggests that supply managers’ familiarity with Tier-
2 suppliers helps them navigate these trade-offs in determining the extent of multi-tier 
sourcing. For example, when faced with higher uncertainty in a Tier-1 supplier’s 
behavior, high familiarity enables supply managers to commit more resources in 
controlling the sourcing decision. Conversely, when faced with lower uncertainty, their 
familiarity with potential lower-tier suppliers increases their willingness to delegate 
authority to the Tier-1 supplier. Moreover, supply managers who lack familiarity with 
potential lower-tier suppliers do not adjust their extent of multi-tier sourcing practices 
regardless of the level of the Tier-1 supplier’s behavioral uncertainty. For a firm that 
intends to use multi-tier sourcing practices, it is of vital importance to encourage and 
train supply managers to be more familiar with potential Tier-2 and further upstream 
suppliers. Developing supply market intelligence through practices like strong category 
management, supply chain mapping, use of Request for Information (RFI), and 
membership of relevant supplier trade associations may all be useful. 
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We also find evidence that interpersonal trust may give supply managers 
confidence to delegate greater responsibility to Tier-1 suppliers. Consistent with the 
governance literature (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), our findings indicate that trust may 
substitute for the use of economic governance mechanisms in buyer-supplier 
relationships. We caution however that this finding is at the interpersonal level; the 
representativeness heuristic means that individual supply managers may overestimate the 
trustworthiness of the supplier overall, leading them to under-invest in governance. 
Ensuring supply managers can separate the levels of interpersonal trust from the broader, 
but potentially weaker, signals of supplier trustworthiness is important. Nonetheless, the 
role of familiarity in lower-tier suppliers comes to fore, as with behavioral uncertainty. 
Where the supply manager also holds high levels of indirect supplier familiarity, they 
delegate greater authority to Tier-1 supplier, than when familiarity is low. In a sense, this 
resonates with the saying ‘trust but verify’ – the supply manager not only has confidence 
that the supplier will perform as promised, but also holds the domain knowledge to verify 
that the performance is appropriate.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our study focuses on behavioral uncertainty in terms of the difficulty of predicting a 
Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance. While supply managers’ sourcing decisions are 
primarily driven by such cost concerns (Choi & Hong, 2002; Ellram, 1992), other 
dimensions of performance like quality, flexibility, innovation, and sustainability are also 
important determinants of multi-tier sourcing. As such, future work could vary the driver 
of behavioral uncertainty or examine how managers from other functional areas such as 
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R&D, manufacturing, or corporate social responsibility may approach this challenge. 
Future studies could adopt field research approaches to investigate how the managers 
from different functional areas interact with each other to transform individual decisions 
regarding multi-tier sourcing to an organizational-level decision. 
Given our focus on the multi-tier sourcing decisions of individual supply 
managers, we emphasized their connection to the Tier-1 supplier and broader familiarity 
with potential Tier-2 suppliers. We were unable to unpack how the characteristics of 
individual lower-tier suppliers influence the sourcing decision. Since subcomponents 
supplied by Tier-2 suppliers are embedded within the component supplied by a Tier-1 
supplier, the decision regarding whether to control a particular subcomponent sourcing 
can be influenced by the factors at both Tier-1 and Tier-2 levels. Incorporating this 
hierarchical nature of multi-tier sourcing decisions into a multi-level experimental design 
(Quinn & Keough, 2002; Raudenbush, 1993) will further enhance our understanding of 
how buying companies use multi-tier sourcing practices. 
Finally, although we used EVM with practicing supply managers to preserve 
internal and external validity of the experiment, the scenarios in our experiment describe 
hypothetical situations in an artificial environment. Case studies or field experiments that 
investigate actual multi-tier sourcing decisions would reveal more complex decision-
making process and relevant biases associated with supply managers’ control over the 
selection and management of lower-tier suppliers. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We investigate an emerging practice of multi-tier sourcing. While the artefacts of multi-
tier sourcing lie at the organizational level, the decision to engage in this practice rests 
primarily with individual supply managers. Shedding light on the behavioral aspects of 
their efforts to achieve efficient sourcing through delegation to a key supplier versus the 
managing risks through exerting sourcing control over lower-tier suppliers is valuable. In 
particular, we highlight the moderating role of familiarity with indirect suppliers in 
enabling supply managers to adjust the extent of multi-tier sourcing in response to 
behavioral uncertainty and interpersonal trust. Further work exploring the dynamics of 
multi-tier sourcing is encouraged. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HORIZONTAL VERSUS VERTICAL STRUCTURAL HOLES IN  
SUPPLY NETWORKS: CONTRASTING PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FOCAL FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Our study investigates the relationship between structural characteristics of the networks 
of buyer-supplier relationships (i.e., supply networks) and firm financial performance. In 
particular, we introduce a novel approach to understanding structural holes in supply 
networks and examine the performance implications of the disconnections between the 
focal firm’s suppliers (i.e., horizontal structural holes) and the disconnections between 
the focal firm’s customers and suppliers (i.e., vertical structural holes). Our analysis 
based on the longitudinal supply network involving semiconductor manufacturers and 
their direct/indirect customers and suppliers reveals contrasting effects of horizontal 
versus vertical structural holes on focal firms’ financial performances. We also find that 
these contrasting influences of the two types of structural holes are more salient for the 
firms with high innovation capability. 
Keywords: structural hole theory, supply network, social network analysis 
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INTRODUCTION 
The growing body of literature that applies social network theories to supply networks 
focuses on the connection between network structures and firm performances (e.g., 
Bellamy, Ghosh, & Hora, 2014; Borgatti & Li, 2009; Carnovale & Yeniyurt, 2015; Choi 
& Kim, 2008; Dong, Liu, Yu, & Zheng, 2015). The studies in this body of literature 
suggest that structural characteristics of supply networks are critically influential for firm 
performances as supply network structures are associated with firm innovation 
performance (Bellamy et al., 2014; Carnovale & Yeniyurt, 2015), supplier selection and 
management (Choi & Kim, 2008; Yan, Choi, Kim, & Yang, 2015), supply risk (Simchi-
Levi et al., 2015) and opportunism between supply chain partners (Dong et al., 2015). 
The linkages between interfirm network structures and firm performances have 
been investigated frequently in the contexts of strategic alliance network, joint venture 
network , and joint research and development (R&D) network (e.g., Baum, Calabrese, & 
Silverman, 2000; Capaldo, 2007; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati, 1998; Lavie, 2007; 
Zaheer & Bell, 2005). However, despite the increasing attention to the linkages between 
supply network structures and firm performances, there has been a lack of studies that 
empirically test the direct relationship between the structural characteristics of supply 
networks and firm financial performance. The performance implications of supply 
networks require special attention due to the unique characteristics of supply networks. 
Unlike strategic alliance or joint venture networks, supply networks are characterized 
with certain directions of materials, service, information, and monetary flows. Firms in a 
supply network have their unique production or service roles (e.g., memory chip 
manufacturer, mobile phone assembler, original equipment manufacturer, consumer 
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electronics retailer, etc.), but their roles as buyer or supplier are relative to the perspective 
of the focal firm (Carter, Rogers, & Choi, 2015).  
Considering these unique characteristics of supply networks, our study provides 
an empirical investigation that aims to provide the implications of particular supply 
network structures for firm financial performance. We suggest a novel way of 
understanding structural holes (Burt, 1992) in supply networks and introduce two 
different types of structural holes: horizontal structural holes—the disconnections 
between a focal firm’s suppliers—and vertical structural holes—the disconnections 
between the focal firm’s customers and suppliers (see Figure 7). As a focal firm has 
multiple roles (e.g., customer, supplier, or middleman) in a supply network (Carter et al., 
2015), structural holes can have very different influences on the focal firm depending on 
how we define the structural holes. Accordingly, we try to answer the following research 
question: What are the effects of horizontal and vertical structural holes on the focal 
firm’s financial performance? Based on the panel data of the network of buyer-supplier 
relationships spanning an eleven-year period, we provide evidence for the contrasting 
impacts of horizontal versus vertical structural holes on focal firms’ financial 
performances. We also show that these contrasting influences of the two types of 
structural holes are more salient for innovative firms. 
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Figure 7. Horizontal Structural Hole and Vertical Structural Hole 
 
We intend to contribute to the supply network literature by introducing the 
concepts of horizontal and vertical structural holes and providing empirical evidence 
based on archival data for the linkage between structural characteristics of supply 
networks and firm financial performance. Especially, the relationship between structural 
holes in supply networks and firm financial performance has remained unclear possibly 
because the conflicting roles of horizontal and vertical structural holes were not 
distinguished. Our study also contributes to the social network literature by suggesting an 
avenue for resolving the ongoing debate regarding the benefits of dense networks with 
less structural holes versus sparse networks rich in structural holes (e.g., Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988, 1990; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008). The conceptual distinction between 
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horizontal and vertical structural holes in a directional network such as supply network 
allows us to clarify the conditions where a focal firm can benefit from both dense and 
sparse networks. In addition, our study provides practical implications for managers 
regarding how innovative firms can utilize and develop supply network structures 
strategically. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Structural Hole Theory 
Structural hole theory (Burt, 1982, 1992) emphasizes the benefits of having non-
redundant ties with other network members who are not connected with one another. 
Structural hole refers to the disconnection between the focal player’s contacts (Burt, 
1992). If two actors in a network are not directly connected to each other but indirectly 
connected through a focal player, it is located on a structural hole. Burt (1997) argues that 
the players who are bridging structural holes have diverse contacts and therefore have 
wider access to information and can capture opportunities earlier than their peers (i.e., 
information benefits). He adds that the players sitting on structural holes are also in a 
better position to know when it would be valuable to bring two disconnected people 
together and control the relationship between them (i.e., control benefits). Simmel (1922) 
and Merton (1957) term these players who benefit from bridging structural holes the 
tertius gaudens (the third who benefits). Burt (1992) argues that having redundant ties 
with the contacts with no structural holes is inefficient because it requires additional 
efforts to maintain those ties while the information acquired through them is repetitive. 
  75 
 In the supply chain literature, structural hole theory or the arguments around ego 
network density (e.g., Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Obstfeld, 2005; Reagans & 
Zuckerman, 2008) has been applied to examine the influence of structural characteristics 
of supply networks on focal firms’ innovation output (Autry & Griffis, 2008; Bellamy et 
al., 2014; Carnovale & Yeniyurt, 2015), joint venture formations (Carnovale, Rogers, & 
Yeniyurt, 2016), operational performance (Kim, 2014), retailers’ role in distribution 
channels (Davis‐Sramek, Germain, & Stank, 2010), opportunism (Dong et al., 2015), 
services outsourcing (Li & Choi, 2009), and supplier-supplier relationships (Choi & Wu, 
2009; Hong & Hartley, 2011). Yet, the evidence for the direct connection between 
structural holes and firm financial performance has remained elusive. 
 We argue that in the supply network context, structural holes can involve very 
different types of non-redundant contacts which result in different types of structural 
holes. Not considering the differences in the types of structural holes can provide mixed 
implications to the competitive position of the focal firm. Due to the unique conditions in 
supply networks involving directionality of materials, service, information, and monetary 
flows (Carter et al., 2015), structural holes in supply networks can have very different 
performance implications to the focal firm depending on how the structural holes are 
defined. In other words, the effects of structural holes on firm performance are relative to 
different types of structural holes. In our study, we distinguish two different types of 
structural holes—horizontal structural hole and vertical structural hole (see Figure 7). We 
expand the terms “horizontal” and “vertical” ties among buyers and suppliers (Lazzarini, 
Claro, & Mesquita, 2008) and apply them to describe the “lack” of ties or disconnection. 
A horizontal structural hole in our study refers to the structural hole between two 
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suppliers of a focal firm. In contrast, a vertical structural hole is defined as the structural 
hole between a customer and a supplier of a focal firm. If multiple customers and 
suppliers are not connected through buyer-supplier relationships among themselves, the 
focal firm can have multiple horizontal and vertical structural holes in its ego network. 
We investigate the influence of these horizontal and vertical structural holes on firm 
financial performance. 
 
Horizontal Structural Holes  
Horizontal structural holes exist when a focal buying firm’s suppliers do not have buyer-
supplier relationships among themselves. If we simply apply structural hole theory 
without considering the unique characteristics of supply networks, having ties with the 
suppliers that have buyer-supplier ties between them can be regarded as being redundant 
and inefficient (Burt, 1992, 2000b). However, we argue that in the supply network 
context, more ties between a focal buying firm’s suppliers (less horizontal structural 
holes) do not necessarily limit its information and control benefits as tertius gaudens. 
Since the focal buying firm procures materials or services from suppliers, it plays the role 
as an integrator rather than a broker or middleman between the suppliers. In this context, 
existing buyer-supplier ties between suppliers can allow the focal firm to facilitate 
cooperation in its upstream supply network (Wu & Choi, 2005). We assume that the 
suppliers do not collude against the common buyer since such collusions are illegal. 
 Contrasting with structural hole theory, Obstfeld (2005) introduces the concept of 
tertius iungens (the third who connects) and proposes the advantages of dense social 
networks with less structural holes. Based on Schumpeter's (1934) view that innovation 
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emerges from combining people, knowledge, and resources, Obstfeld (2005) argues that 
individuals in dense social networks are in advantageous positions to facilitate 
collaborative interactions and promote innovations. Schumpeter (1934) also recognizes 
that innovation is the key source of firm competitiveness and economic development. 
Dense social networks provide conditions for clarifying expectations about effective roles 
of the network members (Podolny & Baron, 1997) and therefore, reduce risks in 
exchange relationships (Moran, 2005). Coleman (1988) also argues that a dense network 
creates social norms and trustworthiness by allowing the network members to use 
reputation effectively as a collective sanctioning mechanism. Bizzi (2013) observes that 
structural holes in group relationships create frictions and problems among the members. 
Since suppliers play critical roles in the process of creating and delivering 
products, connections among suppliers (i.e., lack of horizontal structural holes) can make 
it easier for a focal buying firm to combine resources across the supply network and 
create innovation. Buying firms can proactively create relationships among their 
suppliers to achieve collaborative synergy and market efficiency (Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000; Wu & Choi, 2005). Mena, Humphries, and Choi (2013) suggest that closed supply 
network structure provides the sense of stability and interdependence to the supply 
network members. In this context, a buying firm can better encourage suppliers to engage 
in collaborate activities such as quality improvement, cost reduction, new product 
development, and capacity sharing. 
Moreover, in a supply network structure without ties between suppliers (i.e., 
more horizontal structural holes), a buying firm must rely on each supplier for relevant 
upstream supply information. In this setting, the suppliers may develop less sense of 
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interdependence and tend to behave more opportunistically, as it becomes more difficult 
for the focal buying firm to verify supply information from multiple routes and use 
reputation as collective sanctions against opportunism. Burt (1992) assumes that 
information is not manipulated by the actors in the network, but this may not be readily 
assumed due to potential opportunism (Williamson, 1975, 1985). By the same 
mechanism that benefits tertius gaudens, a focal buying firm’s upstream supply network 
rich in horizontal structural holes concedes information and control benefits to its 
suppliers, as the other members of the network are more likely to be located on structural 
holes in an open network structure (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008). In contrast, if more 
suppliers have buyer-supplier ties with one another, the buying firm can improve its 
financial performance through the closed supply network structure by limiting 
opportunistic behaviors from suppliers and facilitate cooperation between them (Wu & 
Choi, 2005). Thus, we hypothesized that: 
H1: The extent of horizontal structural holes in the focal firm’s supply network is 
negatively associated with its financial performance. 
 
Vertical Structural Holes 
 In contrast to horizontal structural holes, vertical structural holes can enhance the 
competitive position of a focal firm. When the focal firm is located on many structural 
holes between its customers and suppliers, it can actively play the role of the broker or 
middleman that controls the flows of materials and information. As materials or services 
flow from the supplier to the customer through the focal firm, it can take advantage of the 
tertius gaudens (Merton, 1957; Simmel, 1922) position by selectively transferring critical 
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supply-side and demand-side information between its customers and suppliers (Li & 
Choi, 2009). As the information coming from the focal firm’s upstream supply chains is 
likely to be very different from the information from its downstream supply chains, the 
focal firm can enjoy information benefits by having many customers that are 
disconnected with many of its and suppliers (i.e., many vertical structural holes). This 
unique position in the network creates opportunities for the focal firm to combine and 
create new ideas (Burt, 2004). On the contrary, if the focal firm’s customers and suppliers 
are connected through buyer-supplier relationships, they can exchange critical supply and 
demand-side information without the brokerage of the firm in the middle, and it will no 
longer be in a position to access unique information from both sides. 
In addition to information benefits, if the focal firm sits on multiple structural 
holes between several suppliers and customers, it can leverage its position as a broker and 
control material/service flows from certain suppliers to certain customers. Choi and 
Linton (2011) describe the situation where Qualcomm had enjoyed superior financial 
gains by controlling information and financial flows between the previously disconnected 
customer (LG Electronics) and supplier (TSMC). These information and control benefits 
will allow the focal firm to improve its financial performance (Burt, 1992). Overall, a 
focal firm located in a network rich in vertical structural holes is in a unique position to 
collect and integrate information from both supply and demand sides and control the 
information and material flows for its own benefit. Therefore, we expect vertical 
structural holes in the focal firm’s network to have a positive association with its firm 
financial performance. 
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H2: The extent of vertical structural holes in the focal firm’s supply network is 
positively associated with its financial performance. 
 
Innovation Capability and Structural Holes 
Horizontal structural holes can be more damaging for innovative buying firms under fast-
changing technological environment. The risk related to having horizontal structural 
holes becomes more salient for innovative buying firms because they rely more heavily 
on technological developments of their products (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Henderson 
& Clark, 1990). For a focal buying firm, allowing the direct suppliers to occupy structural 
hole positions between the focal firm and other suppliers can limit its access to critical 
technological developments at the component level, gradually eroding the firm’s core 
capability and in turn, financial performance (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001; Reitzig 
& Wagner, 2010; Weigelt, 2009). An upstream supply network with many horizontal 
structural holes makes it more difficult for a buying firm with high innovation capability 
to transfer tacit technological knowledge (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008) and induce 
collaborations among suppliers to facilitate developments of innovative products (Dyer & 
Hatch, 2006). Furthermore, the innovative buying firm with many horizontal structural 
holes can face more difficulties in monitoring technological advancements and cost 
reduction efforts of the suppliers (Camuffo, Furlan, & Rettore, 2007) due to the lack of 
redundant information sources in the upstream supply network that provide and 
corroborate information regarding component-level technological developments. 
In contrast, a denser supply network with less horizontal structural holes can be 
particularly beneficial for innovative firms due to the high potential for advancing 
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technological knowledge through intensive interactions and exchange of ideas among the 
network members (Ahuja, 2000; Obstfeld, 2005). Dense networks can serve as the locus 
of shared knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and facilitate 
the transfer of tacit knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997), which is crucial for 
innovation (Leonard & Sensiper, 1998; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Moreover, a dense 
upstream supply network can reduce information disadvantage of the innovative buying 
firm by providing multiple sources of reaffirming information regarding component 
technological developments. Overall, for an innovative focal firm, more connections 
among its suppliers (less horizontal structural holes) can be particularly advantageous for 
developing and mobilizing technological knowledge and sustain its competitiveness 
through further innovation (Obstfeld, 2005). Therefore, the negative relationship between 
horizontal structural holes and firm financial performance is expected to be stronger 
when innovation capability of the focal firm is high. 
H3: The focal firm’s innovation capability moderates the relationship between the 
extent of horizontal structural holes and its financial performance such that the 
negative relationship is strengthened when innovation capability is high. 
 On the contrary, the positive relationship between vertical structural holes and 
firm performance can be stronger when a focal firm already has high innovation 
capability. Existing stocks of knowledge are critical to the process of combining and 
creating new knowledge (Obstfeld, 2005). Additionally, Burt (2004) argues that 
structural holes provide more opportunities for generating good ideas though access to 
diverse information. With readily advanced innovation capability, the focal firm can 
better detect, interpret, assimilate, and apply new information regarding technological 
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developments and market changes from both supply-side and demand-side and apply it 
for its own product or process innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998). Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt (2000) observe that in environments such as the 
semiconductor industry with fast technological developments, structural holes are 
positively associated with firm performance. Zaheer and Bell (2005) also find that 
innovative mutual fund firms that also bridge structural holes are better at improving their 
performance. The disconnections between the focal firm’s customers and suppliers allow 
it to play the role as a broker of technological and market information and provide a 
unique position to match market opportunities with technological developments from 
upstream supply chains. 
These opportunities originating from vertical structural holes would be less 
valuable for a focal firm with poor innovation capability, since it may not have dynamic 
capabilities of identifying, combining, and exploiting the opportunities (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Lawson & Samson, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Zollo & Winter, 
2002). An innovative focal firm would be better at recognizing the value of technological 
developments and selectively transferring or withholding technological information and 
utilizing it to the firm’s own benefit. Hence, for a focal firm with high innovation 
capability, more vertical structural holes can provide more opportunities for integrating 
and recreating unique information that can be accessed from both upstream and 
downstream supply chains and further improve its financial performance. 
H4: The focal firm’s innovation capability moderates the relationship between the 
extent of vertical structural holes and its financial performance such that the 
positive relationship is strengthened when innovation capability is high. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Sources 
The data is collected from three data sources—Compustat Fundamentals Annual, FactSet 
Supply Chain Relationships, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) patent database. Initial sample companies will be all publicly traded 
manufacturing companies listed in the semiconductor and other electronic component 
manufacturing (33441) industry. We selected this industry since the majority or the firms 
in this industry is publicly traded and they are both customers and suppliers to many 
other firms. This middle-tier supply network positions of the firms in the semiconductor 
and other electronic component manufacturing industry allow us to observe multiple 
horizontal and vertical structural holes. The initial sample companies (363 firms with 
2,490 observations) are identified using Compustat, and then their supply chain 
relationships are collected from FactSet Supply Chain Relationships database. FactSet 
Supply Chain Relationship database provides the archival data on more than 300,000 
contractual buyer-supplier relationships among more than 21,000 firms from 2003 
(FactSet, 2017). FactSet identifies contractual buyer-supplier relationships based on the 
companies’ annual reports, regulatory disclosures, and other announcements. The 
companies that are not identified in FactSet Supply Chain Relationships or have less than 
three suppliers or two customers are excluded from the final sample. We used the 
USPTO patent database to collect the number of granted patent applications of the 
companies in the final sample. The final sample includes 164 firms with 1,115 
observations across the eleven-year period. 
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 Since not all the firms in the initial sample from Compustat are selected as the 
final sample, sample selection bias can exist (Berk, 1983; Greene, 1981; Heckman, 
1979). To prevent endogeneity problems originating from sample selection, we used the 
Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) for analysis. Heckman models consist of two 
estimation stages. In the first stage, we used a probit model to predict the probability of 
being in the sample in a specific year with the sample focal firm’s yearly news article 
search count and the firm size in terms of the natural log of the number of employees. 
News article search count was obtained by searching the focal firm using ProQuest. Since 
the contractual buyer-supplier relationships captured in the FactSet Supply Chain 
Relationships database are identified based on company announcements, news article 
search count and firm size are highly correlated with the likelihood of being included in 
the final sample of our data. Table 6 shows the result of the probit estimation in which 
news article search count and the natural log of the number of employees are strong 
predictors of the probability of being in the sample. Then, based on the predicted values 
from the first stage estimation, we calculated inverse Mills ratios (Heckman, 1979) and 
included them as a control variable in the second stage estimations, which test our 
hypotheses. 
  
  85 
Table 6 
First Stage Probit Estimation of the Heckman Selection Model 
Dependent variable: Sample (1, 0) Coefficient 
Constant −2.152*** 
(0.107) 
Article search count  0.014*** 
(0.001) 
Firm size (ln number of employees)  0.237*** 
(0.015) 
Wald χ2  740.66 
Pseudo R2  0.216 
N  2490 
   *** p < 0.001 
   Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
   Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Variables 
Dependent Variables. Two dependent variables are used to measure the focal firm’s 
financial performance. First, return on assets (ROA) measures the short-term financial 
performance. Second, Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969) is used to measure the focal firm’s stock 
market performance that reflects investors’ expectations of the firm’s long-term financial 
performance. Within the economics and finance literature, long-term, future value of the 
firm is often measured using Tobin’s q whereas ROA (net income/total assets) is 
typically used to measure backward-looking, short-term financial performance of the firm 
(Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004; Mittal, Anderson, Sayrak, & Tadikamalla, 
2005). Tobin’s q is calculated as the following: 
Tobin′s q =
Market value of equity + Book value of liabilities
Book value of equity + Book value of liabilities
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Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the outstanding year-end number of 
shares by share price. 
Independent Variables. The two independent variables of this study are horizontal 
and vertical structural holes. Both measures are adapted from Burt’s (1992) aggregate 
constraint measure. Aggregate constraint measures the degree of concentration of a firm’s 
time and energy in a single group of interconnected member firms in the firm’s ego 
network. In other words, it measures the degree of having no access to structural holes 
(Burt, 1992: Chapter 2). The formulas for Burt’s aggregate constraint are the following: 
Ci = Σjcij, i ≠ j 
Where Ci is network constraint on firm i and cij measures i’s dependence on contact j. 
cij = (pij + Σqpiqpqi)
2, i ≠ q ≠ j 
Where pij is the proportion of i’s network time and energy directly spent on j and 
Σqpiqpqi is the proportion of i’s network time and energy indirectly spent on j. 
 Since Burt’s (1992) aggregate constraint measures no access to structural holes 
and it ranges from 0 to 1, we will use 1 − Ci as the measure of the extent of structural 
holes. To measure the extent of horizontal structural holes, we extracted the focal firm’s 
ego network involving the buyer-supplier relationships between the focal firm and its 
direct suppliers, and the buyer-supplier relationships among the focal firm’s direct 
suppliers. Then we calculated Ci for each focal firm. To measure access to vertical 
structural holes, the focal firm’s ego network involving the focal firm, its direct 
customers and suppliers, and the buyer-supplier relationships between customers and 
suppliers are extracted. The same calculation of Ci is applied to these second type of 
networks to measure vertical structural holes. 
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Moderator Variable. The focal firm’s innovation capability is measured using the 
natural log of the number of the firm’s patents obtained in the past five-year period. 
Patents are commonly used to measure innovation capability of a firm (Bellamy et al., 
2014; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005; Hoetker, 2005; Romijn & Albaladejo, 2002). 
Control Variables. Control variables include global network centrality measures and 
other firm-level variables that can be correlated with both independent and dependent 
variables. Global network centrality measures include indegree and outdegree centralities 
and input and output closeness centralities (Freeman, Roeder, & Mulholland, 1979; Prell, 
2012). Since Burt’s constraint measure is dependent on the number of ties that the focal 
player has (Burt, 1992), it is necessary to control for indegree and outdegree centralities 
to capture the difference between horizontal and vertical structural holes. Closeness 
centralities are included in the model to control for the effect of being adjacent to the 
overall members of the industry-wide network. Since larger firms can have more 
resources to influence supply chain members power (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 2003), we use natural logarithm of total assets as a control for firm size. 
Other firm-level variables that can be correlated with market valuation and short-term 
financial performance are also included as control variables. They include debt to equity 
ratio (liabilities/equity), R&D intensity (R&D expense/sales), capital intensity (capital 
expense/sales), and cost of goods sold to sales ratio (COGS/sales). Year dummy variables 
are also included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across time. Tables 2 and 3 
show descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables in our study. 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics (N = 1,115) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
1. Firm size (ln total assets) 6.899 1.859 1.648 11.433 
2. Debt to equity ratio 0.302 2.253 −33.223 32.675 
3. R&D intensity 0.199 0.325 0 5.304 
4. Capital intensity 0.096 0.159 0.001 2.922 
5. COGS/Sales 0.577 0.349 0.117 6.431 
6. Innovation capability 4.132 2.479 0 9.206 
7. Indegree centrality 13.283 15.449 3 214 
8. Outdegree centrality 20.240 16.709 2 149 
9. Input closeness centrality 0.113 0.021 0.001 0.175 
10. Output closeness centrality 0.156 0.035 0.001 0.234 
11. Horizontal structural holes 0.093 0.073 0.014 1 
12. Vertical structural holes 0.060 0.046 0.009 0.556 
13. Return on assets −0.019 0.167 −0.983 0.312 
14. Tobins’ Q 1.732 2.287 −35.846 21.078 
 
Table 8 
Correlation Matrix (N = 1,115) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Firm size (ln total assets) 1.000       
2. Debt to equity ratio 0.020 1.000      
3. R&D intensity -0.292* -0.032 1.000     
4. Capital intensity 0.229* 0.034 -0.002 1.000    
5. COGS/Sales -0.074* 0.027 0.531* 0.059 1.000   
6. Innovation capability 0.556* -0.031 0.013 0.104* -0.208* 1.000  
7. Indegree centrality 0.487* -0.011 -0.079* 0.079* -0.128* 0.452* 1.000 
8. Outdegree centrality 0.327* -0.021 -0.050 0.019 -0.143* 0.326* 0.481* 
9. Input closeness centrality 0.083* -0.013 0.026 -0.002 -0.064* 0.182* 0.326* 
10. Output closeness centrality 0.133* -0.048 0.025 0.021 -0.108* 0.307* 0.196* 
11. Horizontal structural holes -0.285* 0.008 0.008 -0.083* 0.125* -0.393* -0.368* 
12. Vertical structural holes -0.280* 0.019 0.037 -0.049 0.148* -0.357* -0.335* 
13. Return on assets 0.356* -0.126* -0.322* 0.022 -0.177* 0.183* 0.206* 
14. Tobins’ Q -0.092* 0.603* 0.125* -0.045 -0.045 0.079* 0.034 
 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
8. Outdegree centrality 1.000       
9. Input closeness centrality 0.125* 1.000      
10. Output closeness centrality 0.467* 0.398* 1.000     
11. Horizontal structural holes -0.451* -0.366* -0.570* 1.000    
12. Vertical structural holes -0.551* -0.235* -0.499* 0.823* 1.000   
13. Return on assets 0.126* 0.026 0.032 -0.063* -0.033 1.000  
14. Tobins’ Q 0.010 0.084* 0.067* -0.022 0.003 0.101* 1.000 
* > 0.05 
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Analysis 
We conducted the analysis with the sample firms in the semiconductor and other 
electronic component manufacturing industry (5-digit NAICS 33441) listed in Compustat 
for the eleven-year period from 2004 to 2014. After identifying initial sample firms from 
Compustat, we used the FactSet Supply Chain Relationships database to build an 
industry-wide network at the end of each year from 2003 to 2013. The network involves 
the sample focal firms and their direct customers and suppliers and the customers and 
suppliers of the direct customers and suppliers (i.e., indirect customers and suppliers). As 
an example, Figure 8 shows a diagram of the network at the end of 2012. It includes 
30,099 buyer-supplier relationships among 7,373 firms. Using the industry-wide 
networks across the eleven-year period, we calculated network measures such as various 
centrality measures and the structural hole measures. 
 
 
Figure 8. Sample Network Diagram in 2012 
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Our data has a panel structure in which the variables are measured multiple times 
over several years. Each variable is measured once a year. To analyze the panel data and 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across the firms in the sample, we used fixed effect 
models. To minimize multicollinearity problems when testing interaction effects, we 
grand-mean centered (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998) horizontal and 
vertical structural holes and innovation capability variables.  
The regression equation below represents the fixed effect model we used to test 
our hypotheses: 
Yit = β0 + β1Horizontal_Structural_Holesit + β2Vertical_Structural_Holesit
+ β3Innovation_Capability ∗ Horizontal_Structural_Holesit
+ β4Innovation_Capability ∗ Vertical_Structural_Holesit + βnXit + αi
+ uit 
Where:  
Yit indicates the two dependent variables (ROA and Tobin’s q) where i is firm and t is 
year.  
Xit includes control variables, innovation capability, and year fixed effects. 
αi indicates firm fixed effects and uit is the error term. 
 
RESULTS 
We conducted two separate fixed-effects regression analyses with ROA and Tobin’s q as 
dependent variables. Clustered robust standard errors were used to estimate the 
significances of the coefficients. Table 9 shows the result of the fixed-effects regression 
with ROA as the dependent variable. Model 3 shows the result after controlling for 
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sample selection bias. The coefficient for horizontal structural holes (B = −0.41, p > 0.1) 
is not significant at the p < 0.05 level. Therefore, H1 is not supported when the dependent 
variable is ROA. However, the coefficient for vertical structural holes (B = 0.68, p < 
0.05) is significant, supporting H2. The interaction between innovation capability and 
horizontal structural holes (B = −0.18, p < 0.01) has a significant negative association 
with ROA, supporting H3. Figure 9 shows that the negative effect of horizontal structural 
holes is stronger when the focal firm has higher innovation capability. In addition, the 
interaction between innovation capability and vertical structural holes (B = 0.21, p < 
0.05) has a significant positive association with ROA, supporting H4. Figure 10 shows 
the positive effect of vertical structural holes on ROA is stronger for the focal firm with 
higher innovation capability. 
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Table 9 
Result of the Fixed-Effects Regression with ROA as Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable: ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant −0.216† 
(0.118) 
−0.241* 
(0.115) 
−0.293* 
(0.122) 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills ratio    0.029 
(0.034) 
Firm size (ln total assets)  0.021 
(0.015) 
 0.021 
(0.015) 
 0.026† 
(0.015) 
Debt to equity ratio −0.005 
(0.004) 
−0.005 
(0.004) 
−0.005 
(0.004) 
R&D intensity −0.342*** 
(0.051) 
−0.344*** 
(0.051) 
−0.340*** 
(0.050) 
Capital intensity  0.049 
(0.034) 
 0.048 
(0.034) 
 0.047 
(0.034) 
COGS/Sales  0.156** 
(0.046) 
 0.157** 
(0.046) 
 0.155** 
(0.045) 
Innovation capability −0.013 
(0.010) 
−0.009 
(0.010) 
−0.008 
(0.010) 
Indegree centrality −0.0001 
(0.0004) 
−0.0001 
(0.0004) 
−0.0001 
(0.0004) 
Outdegree centrality −0.0001 
(0.001) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
 0.0003 
(0.001) 
Input closeness centrality −0.379 
(0.347) 
−0.381 
(0.344) 
−0.373 
(0.342) 
Output closeness centrality  0.435 
(0.404) 
 0.525 
(0.361) 
 0.538 
(0.359) 
Horizontal structural holes (H1)  −0.402 
(0.258) 
−0.411 
(0.258) 
Vertical structural holes (H2)   0.683* 
(0.327) 
 0.683* 
(0.331) 
Horizontal SH × Innov. capa. (H3)  −0.181** 
(0.069) 
−0.184** 
(0.069) 
Vertical SH × Innov. capa. (H4)   0.205* 
(0.093) 
 0.206* 
(0.094) 
R2 within  0.158  0.168  0.169 
F-test   3.44**  0.74 
N observations  1115  1115  1115 
N groups  164  164  164 
          † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
          Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
          Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Figure 9. Interaction between Horizontal Structural Holes and Innovation Capability on 
ROA 
 
 
Figure 10. Interaction between Vertical Structural Holes and Innovation Capability on 
ROA 
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Table 10 shows the result of the fixed-effects regression with Tobin’s q as the 
dependent variable. After controlling for sample selection bias in Model 3, horizontal 
structural holes (B = −4.64, p < 0.05) show a significant negative association with 
Tobin’s q, providing support for H1. In contrast, vertical structural holes (B = 5.95, p < 
0.5) show a significant positive association with Tobin’s q, supporting H2. The 
interaction between innovation capability and horizontal structural holes (B = −1.76, p < 
0.01) has a significant negative association with Tobin’s q, supporting H3. Figure 11 is 
the interaction plot which shows that the negative impact of horizontal structural holes is 
stronger when the focal firm has higher innovation capability. However, the interaction 
between vertical structural holes (B = 1.48, p > 0.1) does not have a significant 
association with Tobin’s q, not supporting H4. 
 Overall, H2 and H3 are fully supported, and H1 and H4 are partially supported. 
H1 is supported only when the dependent variable is ROA while H4 is supported only 
when the dependent variable is Tobin’s q. We interpret and discuss these results further 
in the following section. 
  
  95 
Table 10 
Result of the Fixed-Effects Regression with Tobin’s Q as Dependent Variable 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant  6.854*** 
(1.506) 
 6.709*** 
(1.497) 
 7.509*** 
(1.586) 
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes 
Inverse Mills ratio   −0.444 
(0.344) 
Firm size (ln total assets) −0.756*** 
(0.201) 
−0.748*** 
(0.198) 
−0.814*** 
(0.204) 
Debt to equity ratio  0.708** 
(0.209) 
 0.707** 
(0.209) 
 0.709** 
(0.209) 
R&D intensity −0.535 
(.668) 
−0.547 
(0.680) 
−0.607 
(0.656) 
Capital intensity  0.436 
(0.727) 
 0.418 
(0.719) 
 0.437 
(0.718) 
COGS/Sales  0.154 
(0.492) 
 0.171 
(0.491) 
 0.211 
(0.481) 
Innovation capability  0.102 
(0.113) 
 0.167 
(0.115) 
 0.157 
(0.113) 
Indegree centrality −0.005 
(0.004) 
−0.006 
(0.004) 
−0.007 
(0.004) 
Outdegree centrality  0.011† 
(0.006) 
 0.014* 
(0.007) 
 0.014* 
(0.007) 
Input closeness centrality −2.094 
(4.008) 
−2.223 
(4.071) 
−2.347 
(4.065) 
Output closeness centrality −2.143 
(2.975) 
−2.039 
(2.535) 
−2.237 
(2.567) 
Horizontal structural holes (H1)  −4.789* 
(2.158) 
−4.644* 
(2.152) 
Vertical structural holes (H2)   5.950† 
(3.046) 
 5.954* 
(3.016) 
Horizontal SH × Innov. capa. (H3)  −1.800** 
(0.669) 
−1.762** 
(0.678) 
Vertical SH × Innov. capa. (H4)   1.481 
(0.953) 
 1.478 
(0.952) 
R2 within  0.587  0.591  0.592 
F-test   2.65*  0.20 
N observations  1115  1115  1115 
N groups  164  164  164 
          † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
          Unstandardized coefficients are reported. 
          Clustered robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
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Figure 11. Interaction between Horizontal Structural Holes and Innovation Capability on 
Tobin’s Q 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the analysis provide contrasting financial performance implications of 
horizontal versus vertical structural holes in supply networks for focal firms in the 
semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing industry. We found that 
horizontal structural holes have a negative impact on ROA whereas vertical structural 
holes positively influence both ROA and Tobin’s q of the focal firm. In other words, 
having suppliers that are disconnected (i.e., no buyer-supplier relationship) with each 
other is detrimental to a firm’s financial performance while disconnections between the 
focal firm’s customers and suppliers can improve its financial performance. These 
contrasting aspects of horizontal versus vertical structural holes seem to influence the 
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focal firm’s short-term and long-term financial performances differently. On the one 
hand, having more suppliers that are connected to each other through buyer-supplier 
relationships (i.e., less horizontal structural holes) is associated with the focal firm’s 
long-term (Tobin’s q) rather than a short-term (ROA) financial performance. This finding 
may imply that although the focal firm with less horizontal structural holes cannot pursue 
short-term financial gains by taking an information broker position and preventing 
information sharing among its suppliers, it can benefit in the long-term from 
collaborations among the suppliers that are facilitated by existing buyer-supplier 
relationships with each other. On the other hand, more vertical structural holes between 
the focal firm’s customers and suppliers are associated with better short-term (ROA) and 
long-term (Tobin’s q) financial performances. This finding supports the classic 
arguments of structural hole theory (Burt, 1982, 1992). A focal firm with more vertical 
structural holes can have better access to unique information from both upstream and 
downstream supply chains and use the unique information to improve its financial 
performance. 
We also found that for an innovative focal firm, more disconnections among its 
suppliers (i.e., more horizontal structural holes) can be harmful to both short-term and 
long-term financial performances. Reagans and Zuckerman (2008) argue that there are 
risks associated with relying on non-redundant ties with more structural holes, because 
ambiguous information or tacit knowledge may be better transferred through redundant 
ties in a dense network. Therefore, an innovative focal firm with rich tacit knowledge in 
new product or process development would find it more difficult to facilitate knowledge 
transfer among suppliers if they do not interact with each other through buyer-supplier 
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relationships. On the contrary, the positive interaction between vertical structural holes 
and innovation capability on ROA suggest that innovative focal firms are better at 
improving short-term financial performance by utilizing their middleman positions 
between customers and suppliers. With superior absorptive capacity and existing stocks 
of knowledge accumulated through innovation activities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tsai, 
2001), focal firms with higher innovation capability seem to better utilize unique 
information from upstream and downstream supply chains and improve short-term 
financial performance. However, potentially due to the lack of innovation collaborations 
and cohesion between customers and suppliers, innovative focal firms with more vertical 
structural holes do not enjoy additional long-term financial gains compared to their less 
innovative counterparts. 
 
Theoretical Contribution 
The findings of our study highlight the importance of considering directionality in supply 
networks and suggest the relativity of structural holes in such networks. Depending on 
how structural holes are defined based on the directions of the ties in a supply network, 
structural holes can have contrasting effects on a focal firm’s performance. 
Structural holes can exist between not only the focal firm's suppliers but also its 
customers and suppliers. Unlike other interfirm alliance or joint venture network research 
in strategic management where ego firms and alter firms are all "partners," the context of 
our study is the supply network where the nodes can be either buyers or 
suppliers relative to the perspective of the focal firm (Carter et al., 2015). Not considering 
these unique characteristics of supply network can provide inaccurate implications on the 
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roles of structural holes in supply networks. As Borgatti and Li (2009) suggest, we avoid 
simplistic application of social network concepts into the supply network context. We 
intend to contribute to both structural hole theory and the literature on supply network 
structures by providing theoretical and empirical evidence for how the mechanisms 
behind structural holes can function differently relative to the specific contexts in supply 
networks. 
 Our study also contributes to the ongoing debates regarding the performance 
implications of redundant ties or dense networks in the social network literature (e.g., 
Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Rowley et al., 2000). By 
considering the directions of the flows in supply networks and distinguishing horizontal 
and vertical structural holes, we provide the potential for resolving seemingly competing 
arguments about the benefits of dense networks (Coleman, 1988, 1990) versus structural 
holes (Burt, 1992). Based on the empirical evidence of our study, we call for further 
theoretical and methodological developments that incorporate directionality in 
conceptualizing structural holes or interconnectedness in a network.   
 In addition, our study also contributes to the field of supply chain management by 
applying social network theories and analysis for empirical testing. While there have 
been continued applications of social network analysis for analyzing supply networks 
(Carnovale & Yeniyurt, 2014; Kim et al., 2011), the use of the methodology is still in its 
nascent stage partly due to the difficulties in acquiring large-scale supply network data. 
By utilizing the longitudinal buyer-supplier relationship data in the FactSet Supply Chain 
Relationships database, we apply social network analysis and provide new ways of 
understanding structural holes in supply networks. 
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Managerial Implications 
Our study provides several managerial implications. First, especially for a firm with high 
innovation capability, developing dense upstream supply networks with more buyer-
supplier relationships among its suppliers can be beneficial for its overall financial 
performance. Even for a firm with lower innovation capability, dense upstream supply 
networks can be useful for preventing opportunistic behaviors and improve its long-term 
financial performance. There are multiple ways of developing denser upstream supply 
networks. Buying firms can induce contractual relationships between suppliers (Wu & 
Choi, 2005), initiate direct contractual relationships with Tier-2 suppliers (Choi & Hong, 
2002; Choi & Linton, 2011), or select suppliers with existing buyer-supplier relationships 
among themselves. Buying firms should consider these options to reduce horizontal 
structural holes in their upstream supply networks. 
 In addition, a firm in middleman positions between its multiple customers and 
suppliers can enjoy superior financial performances by actively sustaining vertical 
disconnections between the customers and suppliers. Supply chain scholars have 
emphasized the dangers of supply chain disintermediation in which a focal firm’s 
customers make direct transactions with the focal firm’s suppliers (Li & Choi, 2009; 
Rossetti & Choi, 2008). Conceptually, the more supply chain disintermediation, the less 
vertical structural holes for a focal firm. By developing the concept of vertical structural 
holes and empirically testing their effects on firm financial performance, our study 
substantiates the arguments for the dangers of supply chain disintermediation. Managers 
should be aware of the financial disadvantages of supply chain disintermediation and 
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engage actively in sustaining middleman positions of their firms between customers and 
suppliers. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The potential threat to external validity of this study comes from the fact that the sample 
firms are from only the semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing 
industry. Future studies should investigate the effects of vertical and horizontal structures 
in other industry contexts. Although this study tries to limit endogeneity issues by using 
multiple control variables, year and firm fixed effects, and the Heckman selection model, 
there is a possibility of omitted variable bias. For example, the focal firm’s or its 
customers’ collaborative tendency to supply chain members may influence both the 
structural holes and the financial performance of the firm. Identification of these potential 
omitted variables will enhance the validity of this study’s findings. Another limitation of 
this study comes from the limitations in the FactSet Supply Chain Relationship data. The 
buyer-supplier relationships identified in this data do not show the relative importance of 
the relationships. The data shows only the existences of the buyer-supplier relationships 
in binary formats. Future studies can develop more advanced measures for vertical and 
horizontal structural holes by incorporating the relative importance of the focal firm’s 
customers and suppliers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
This dissertation investigates the theoretical and behavioral factors that influence supply 
chain make-buy decisions and provides performance implications of supply network 
structures that are associated with supply chain make-buy. The findings of the 
dissertation provide important implications to both theory and managerial practice. 
 The first study in Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on make-buy decisions by 
considering the “bundle of transactions” as the unit-of-analysis and expanding the level 
of analysis from the dyadic context (i.e., direct transaction between the buying firm and 
top-tier supplier) to the multi-tier level (i.e., direct and indirect transactions among the 
buying firm, top-tier supplier, and lower-tier suppliers). The present study adds to this 
body of literature by providing a new perspective which considers the transactions 
throughout the supply chain involving the lower-tier suppliers. The propositions and 
heuristic models in Chapter 2 also offer a new perspective for organizing transactions to 
mitigate risks. By considering both direct, bilateral transactions and indirect transactions, 
Chapter 2 diverts from the traditional TCE literature’s predictions on organizing 
transactions. For example, without recognizing the supply chain-make option, the 
traditional TCE literature would suggest the buying firm adopting hierarchical 
governance when the transaction with the top-tier supplier is characterized by high asset 
specificity and behavioral uncertainty (Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, the supply 
chain make-buy model implies that the buying firm does not necessarily have to rely on 
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hierarchical governance if it can reduce the risk of opportunism by engaging in supply 
chain-make. 
For managers, Chapter 2 provides a guideline for making the choice between 
supply chain-make and supply chain-buy. It also offers some suggestions for managing 
multiple tiers of the supply network, if their decision is supply chain-make. Asset 
specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and supply risk can increase the cost of managing 
exchange relationships with the top-tier suppliers. In addition, under high tacitness of 
intellectual property and interdependence in the product architecture, supply chain-buy 
can quickly erode the firm’s opportunities for technological developments. Considering 
these variables will help the managers make the right supply chain make-buy decision. 
The second study of this dissertation (Chapter 3) suggest that individual supply 
managers’ decisions regarding the use of multi-tier sourcing practices are subject to 
several key heuristics. First, when faced with uncertainty in the Tier-1 supplier’s cost 
performance, supply managers try to reduce uncertainty by exercising greater control 
over subcomponent sourcing and minimizing information asymmetry between the buyer 
and the Tier-1 supplier. Second, supply managers tend to be influenced more saliently by 
interpersonal-level trust than interorganizational-level behavioral uncertainty when they 
make multi-tier sourcing decisions. Lastly, while supply managers use multi-tier sourcing 
practices to cope with perceived uncertainty in the relationship with the Tier-1 supplier, 
the extent of use is subject to their familiarity with potential Tier-2 suppliers. 
The result of the experiment suggests that supply managers’ familiarity with Tier-
2 suppliers helps them navigate these trade-offs in determining the extent of multi-tier 
sourcing. For a firm that intends to use multi-tier sourcing practices, it is of vital 
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importance to encourage and train supply managers to be more familiar with potential 
Tier-2 and further upstream suppliers. Chapter 3 also finds evidence that interpersonal 
trust may give supply managers confidence to delegate greater responsibility to Tier-1 
suppliers. Ensuring supply managers can separate the levels of interpersonal trust from 
the broader, but potentially weaker, signals of supplier trustworthiness is important. 
Nonetheless, the role of familiarity in lower-tier suppliers comes to fore, as with 
behavioral uncertainty. Where the supply manager also holds high levels of indirect 
supplier familiarity, they delegate greater authority to Tier-1 supplier, than when 
familiarity is low. This encourages supply managers to have not only confidence that the 
supplier will perform as promised, but also the domain knowledge to verify that the 
performance is appropriate. 
Lastly, the study in Chapter 4 highlights the importance of considering 
directionality in supply networks and suggests the relativity of structural holes in such 
networks. Depending on how structural holes are defined based on the directions of the 
ties in a supply network, structural holes can have contrasting effects on a focal firm’s 
performance. Not considering these unique characteristics of supply network can provide 
inaccurate implications on the roles of structural holes in supply networks. Chapter 4 
contributes to both structural hole theory and the literature on supply network structures 
by providing theoretical and empirical evidence for how the mechanisms behind 
structural holes can function differently relative to the specific contexts in supply 
networks. Chapter 4 also contributes to the ongoing debates regarding the performance 
implications of redundant ties or dense networks in the social network literature (e.g., 
Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2008; Rowley et al., 2000). By 
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considering the directions of the flows in supply networks and distinguishing horizontal 
and vertical structural holes, the study provides the potential for resolving seemingly 
competing arguments about the benefits of dense networks (Coleman, 1988, 1990) versus 
structural holes (Burt, 1992). 
Chapter 4 also provides several managerial implications. First, especially for a 
firm with high innovation capability, developing dense upstream supply networks with 
more buyer-supplier relationships among its suppliers can be beneficial for its overall 
financial performance. Even for a firm with lower innovation capability, dense upstream 
supply networks can be useful for preventing opportunistic behaviors and improve its 
long-term financial performance. In addition, a firm in middleman positions between its 
multiple customers and suppliers can enjoy superior financial performances by actively 
sustaining vertical disconnections between the customers and suppliers. By developing 
the concept of vertical structural holes and empirically testing their effects on firm 
financial performance, the study substantiates the arguments for the dangers of supply 
chain disintermediation. 
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1. Invitation Letter 
 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you very much for helping with this research project. I am a Ph.D. student in the 
Department of Supply Chain Management at Arizona State University. My research team 
(Professors Benn Lawson, Thomas Kull, and Thomas Choi) and I are studying managers’ 
decision making about the allocation of sourcing responsibility between lead OEM firms 
and their Tier 1 suppliers. We are particularly interested in understanding how managers 
make these decisions under different situations. We are willing to share the results of the 
study that may help your future supply decisions. 
You can expect this survey to take 5-10 minutes to complete. There are two parts in this 
survey. The first part describes a supply chain decision making scenario and asks your 
choices. The second part asks your background information and preferences. 
Your participation in this research is voluntary and you can skip the questions if you 
wish. Your participation will enhance understanding of supply decision making and help 
future supply chain students and managers. Your answers are confidential and 
there are no expected risks or discomfort to your participation. Aggregate responses will 
be analyzed, summarized, presented at research conferences, and may be published in 
academic journals. Results will be shared only in aggregate forms and your personal 
details will not be disclosed. You must be 18 years or older to participate. 
For any questions regarding this research, please contact me: Sangho Chae 
(schae9@asu.edu, 480-965-6044). You can also contact Professor Thomas Kull 
(thomas.kull@asu.edu, 480-965-6125). For any questions about your rights as a 
participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, please contact the 
Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the Arizona State 
University Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at 480-965-6788. 
Thank you again for your help. 
 
Sincerely, 
Sangho Chae 
Department of Supply Chain Management 
Arizona State University 
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2. Scenario Introduction 
You are a purchasing manager at a global automotive producer and responsible for the 
procurement of in-car entertainment systems. Profit margins at your company have 
recently come under intense pressure, and while your job performance is evaluated 
against multiple criteria, the most important is achieving target cost goals.  
Recently, your company and a local electronics supplier have been working together to 
design an innovative entertainment system for the latest range of models. The 
entertainment system is considered a strategic module with high profit impact, and your 
company has retained all intellectual property, including drawings, schematics, and bill of 
materials (BOM). The electronics supplier has already been selected as the Tier-1 
supplier. However, the design of the in-car entertainment system requires the 
procurement of technologically advanced, highly complex sub-components from 
suppliers located at Tier-2 and below. You are considering how best to manage the 
sourcing of these sub-components, in particular the allocation of sourcing responsibilities 
between your company and the Tier-1 electronics supplier. 
 
3. Scenario Manipulation 
1) Behavioral uncertainty regarding the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance 
a) High behavioral uncertainty 
In reviewing the Tier-1 supplier’s performance you note they have consistently met 
requirements for quality, delivery, and flexibility over the last three years. Importantly, 
however, their performance in meeting target cost goals in previous projects has been 
unpredictable, and you are unsure whether they will achieve the target cost for the new 
entertainment system.  
b) Low behavioral uncertainty 
In reviewing the Tier-1 supplier’s performance you note they have consistently met 
requirements for quality, delivery, and flexibility over the last three years. Importantly, 
they have also consistently met target cost goals in previous projects, and you are 
confident that they will also achieve the target cost for the new entertainment system. 
 
2) Lower-tier familiarity 
a) High familiarity 
As the purchasing manager for the in-car entertainment system, you understand the bill of 
materials (BOM) structure of the module to be purchased and have basic knowledge 
about the key sub-components that comprise the system. You are also familiar with the 
potential sub-component suppliers at Tier-2 and below, and have prior experience of 
working with them. 
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b) Low familiarity 
As the purchasing manager for the in-car entertainment system, you understand the bill of 
materials (BOM) structure of the module to be purchased and have basic knowledge 
about the key sub-components that comprise the system. However, you are not very 
familiar with the potential sub-component suppliers at Tier-2 and below, and have very 
little experience of working with them. 
 
3) Interpersonal trust between the supply manager and the Tier-1 supplier’s sales 
representative 
a) High interpersonal trust 
In working with the Tier-1 supplier, you have maintained a close relationship with their 
sales representative. You consider the sales representative to be trustworthy and fair in 
negotiations with you. The sales representative can always be counted on to act as you 
expect and will not take advantage of you. 
b) Low interpersonal trust 
In working with the Tier-1 supplier, you have maintained an arm’s length relationship 
with the sales representative. You consider the sales representative to be not very 
trustworthy and has not always been fair in negotiations with you. The sales 
representative cannot always be counted on to act as you expect and may take advantage 
of you. 
 
4. Decision making questions 
1) Based on the case described, which of the following statements best reflects your view 
of the degree of direct sourcing control you wish to exercise over the Tier 1 
supplier?  More control by your company requires more managerial and organizational 
resources. 
(1) Full control by the Tier-1 supplier 
(2) Extensive control by the Tier-1 supplier 
(3) Moderate control by the Tier-1 supplier 
(4) Control evenly shared by your company and the Tier-1 supplier 
(5) Moderate control by your company 
(6) Extensive control by your company 
(7) Full control by your company 
 
2) Based on the case described, please select an option below which best reflects your 
supplier selection strategy. The options require increasing levels of managerial and 
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organizational resources; with the first option the least, followed by the second option, 
and then the third option. 
A. Request that the Tier-1 supplier select its sub-component suppliers from your 
company’s existing approved vendor list. 
B. Mandate the Tier-1 supplier use specific sub-component suppliers as selected by your 
company from the existing approved vendor list. 
C. Negotiate directly with key sub-component suppliers regarding pricing and other 
specifications, and then require the Tier-1 supplier to work with these specific suppliers. 
 
4. Manipulation checks 
(All items use the following scale: Strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly agree) 
1) It is difficult to predict the Tier-1 supplier’s cost performance. 
2) You are familiar with the potential sub-component suppliers. 
3) You trust the sales representative of the Tier-1 supplier. 
 
5. Background information 
1) How many years of work experience do you have? 
2) How many years of work experience are in the supply management profession? 
3) What is your current industry? 
4) How many employees are in your entire company or organization? 
5) How many employees are in your supply management organization? 
6) What is your gender? 
7) What is your age? 
 
6. Personal risk propensity 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
yourself. 
(All items use the following scale: Strongly disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly agree) 
1) I prefer to avoid risks. 
2) I take risks regularly. 
3) I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. 
4) I view myself as a risk seeker. 
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EXEMPTION GRANTED
Thomas Kull
Supply Chain Management
480/965-6125
Thomas.Kull@asu.edu
Dear Thomas Kull:
On 2/8/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:
Type of Review: Initial Study
Title: Behavioral Investigation of the Supply Chain Make-
Buy Decision Making
Investigator: Thomas Kull
IRB ID: STUDY00003826
Funding: None
Grant Title: None
Grant ID: None
Documents Reviewed: • ChaeSurveyDesign.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions);
• HRP-503a-
TEMPLATE_PROTOCOL_SocialBehavioralV02-10-
15.docx, Category: IRB Protocol;
• ChaeConsentLetter.pdf, Category: Consent Form;
• ChaeSurveyDesign.pdf, Category: Recruitment 
Materials;
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 2/8/2016. 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
Sincerely,
